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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN RETIREMENT SECURITY
Hung Yee Fong
Supervisor: Olivia S. Mitchell
The first chapter “Investment Patterns in Singapore’s Central Provident Fund
System” investigates how plan participants in a national defined contribution system
invest their pension accumulations. I find that only a small fraction of participants elects
to invest in outside investment products like professionally-managed mutual funds.
Simulation results using cost data from over 200 funds demonstrate that the minimum
hurdle rate of return a fund must generate is about five percent a year. Accordingly,
more policy attention can be devoted to lowering fund commission charges and
rationalizing the investment menu offered to participants.
In the second chapter “Longevity Risk Management in Singapore’s National
Pension System”, I evaluate the money’s worth of life annuities and discuss the
implications of the government entering the insurance market as a public-sector
provider for annuities. I find that commercial insurers offer competitively-priced
annuities with money’s worth ratios averaging 0.95, which are on par with those in
other developed countries. On the other hand, the new annuities launched by
government under an annuitization mandate are estimated to provide money’s worth
ratios exceeding unity. This will benefit annuitants on average but implies that the
annuity mandate will be expensive for the government if current pricing continues.
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The third chapter “Beyond Age and Sex: Enhancing Annuity Pricing” assesses
how adopting more detailed pricing schemes may help reduce adverse selection in
annuity markets. Prices of standard annuity products in the United States do not
currently reflect buyers’ personal characteristics other than age and sex. I show that
several readily-measurable risk factors can significantly increase explained variability
in mortality outcomes in a proportional hazards framework and use them to construct
alternative pricing schemes. Simulation results show that more detailed pricing may
help reduce adverse selection in annuity markets because shorter-lived groups are made
much better off (and thus enter the market) while longer-lived groups are made only
slightly worse off (and thus remain in the market).
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CHAPTER 1
Investment Patterns in Singapore’s Central Provident Fund System1

In the four short decades between 1990 and 2030, the global tally of persons age
60+ will burgeon from 500 million to almost 1.5 billion individuals. As much of this
demographic aging will take place in Asia, it follows that retirement systems in Asia
will come under substantial pressure. This paper focuses on one of Asia’s most famous
retirement programs, Singapore’s national defined contribution program known as the
Central Provident Fund (CPF). Our goal is to review how workers are allocating their
retirement saving across the various investment options made available under the CPF,
and to assess whether alternative investment choices might enhance retirement saving.
In particular, we address four questions:


What fund choices are currently available for workers covered by the CPF,
and how do people allocate their retirement saving?



How do these investment patterns vary according to participant characteristics,
and how do they compare to those in other countries?



How do investment options outside the government default investment pool
compare, in terms of fees and charges?



What policy conclusions may be derived regarding the current investment mix
provided for retirement saving?

1

This chapter is published in the Journal of Pension Economics and Finance (Cambridge University
Press). See Benedict SK. Koh, Olivia S. Mitchell, Toto Tanuwidjaja, and Joelle HY. Fong, 2008,
Investment patterns in Singapore's Central Provident Fund System, Journal of Pension Economics and
Finance, Volume 7(1), pp. 37-65.
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In what follows, we first outline the structure of Singapore's retirement system,
focusing on the links between the national mandatory provident fund structure and other
types of asset accumulation in the nation. Next, we show how government policy has
influenced asset accumulation and investment patterns. 2 Subsequently, we explore
several questions about asset allocation patterns by demographic attributes. Last, we
assess how the fees and charges associated with investing in a CPF unit trust can impact
the investment return over various time horizons. 3 Since workers who default their
money to the CPF fund receive a guaranteed 2.5% return on his Ordinary Account and
4% on his Special Account, this means that hurdle rates for money market and equity
funds are rather substantial. These high hurdle rates help explain why few CPF account
holders invest outside the default government investment pool. On the other hand,
inertia probably explains why many employees let their funds sit in bank accounts
earning low interest rates, rather than opting for either the CPF fund or other permitted
investments.

1.1 Investment Patterns
The CPF in Singapore was first established in 1955 as a forced savings
program;4 half a century later, it has evolved into a wide-ranging social security system

2

This paper does not focus on decumulation patterns; these have been studied by Chen et al. (1997;
1998); Doyle et al. (2004), and Fong (2002).
3
In the United States, a unit investment trust generally refers to a fixed, unmanaged portfolio of incomeproducing securities. Shares in the trust are sold to investors who received capital gains, dividend
payments and interest at regular periods. A unit investment trust is typically considered a low-risk, lowreturn investment. Unit trusts in Singapore are more comparable to mutual funds in the US.
4
Low and Aw (1997) trace the historical roots of the Singaporean CPF; see also Low and Aw (2004).
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covering 3.1 million CPF members, of whom 1.46 million are active (as of 12/06).5.
Since its inception, the CPF has been a defined contribution plan financed by mandatory
levies on employees’ regular monthly earnings up to an earnings cap. Contribution rates
and caps have varied over time, with current rates amounting to between 8.5% and 33%
of salary depending on the employee’s age, and the ceiling is set at $4,500 per month6
(in 2006; see Table 1.1). Initially all contributions were held in a single account, but
over time additional accounts were created. Of most interest for our purposes, the
Ordinary Account (OA) and Special Account (SA) concepts were introduced in the late
1970s; the former is intended for financing of home purchases, insurance premiums,
education expenses, and other saving, while the Special Account, created in 1977, is
mainly targeted toward old-age saving. The Medisave account, introduced in 1984, is
designed to be spent on medical care expenses and catastrophic illness insurance (see
Figure 1.1).
[Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1 here]
Total CPF contributions vary with age, and so too does the breakdown of the
allocations across accounts. Currently young workers (≤ 35 yrs old) have 6% of their
total contributions dedicated to the Medisave account, 22% of their totals to the
Ordinary Account, and 5% to the Special Account.

By contrast, older workers

(age >55-60) contribute 18.5% of covered pay split 8%, 10.5%, and 0%, respectively,
across the three accounts. Figure 1.2 and Table 1.2 depict the time pattern of OA and
SA contribution rates for a “prime-age worker” in the 35-45 age range. Such an

5
6

Active CPF members are persons with at least one contribution in the current or preceding three months.
The exchange rate as of December 2006 was S$1=US$0.64.
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individual would have had to contribute 10 percent of covered earnings in the 1950s to
the single pooled account, with the rate rising steadily to 37 percent by 1979 when the
Special Account was created. Thereafter, the non-medical savings portion of the CPF
for this prime-age group of workers – that is, just the OA and SA combined elements –
rose to 46% of covered pay by 1983, and then fell to the mid-to-low 30’s over the 1990s.
By the end of the 1990s, in response to the Asian financial crisis, the CPF savings
contribution for OA and SA combined was slashed to 23%, and it now stands at 26% of
covered pay.
[Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2 here]
The flow of funds into the CPF over time has resulted in substantial asset
accumulation by scheme participants. Contributions to the OA, SA, and Medisave
accounts total S$16.1B and CPF balances stand at S$119.8B (12/05), or about threefifths of Singapore’s GDP that year.7 As shown in Table 1.3, the growth rate of the CPF
asset pool has averaged over 7% per annum since 2003.
[Table 1.3 here]
When the CPF was first established, the Provident Fund Board centrally directed
all investible funds and a government-set rate of return was paid on the assets. This
annual percentage return was set in 1955 at 2.5%, a figure that rose to 5% in 1963, and
peaked at 6.5% in the mid-1980s (see Table 1.4). Thereafter, the return was gradually
reduced to around 2.5-3% through the mid-1990s. The SA rate was set at 1.25
percentage points above the OA/Medisave rate in mid-1995, and raised to 1.5
percentage points in July 1998. There has been no change in the OA and SA rates since
7

Singapore’s 2005 GDP at current market prices was S$194.2B (Source: www.singstat.gov.sg).
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mid-1999; the annual OA rate is 2.5% and the SA return is 4%. As explained by the
CPF Board, the actual return paid for the Ordinary Account is the higher of this floor, or
the “market-related interest rate (based on the 12-month fixed deposit and month-end
savings rates of the major local banks)”. 8 For the Special and Retirement Accounts,
members earn additional interest of 1.5 percentage points above the normal CPF interest
rate. 9 In other words, the Board guarantees a relatively safe minimum nominal return,
and it also offers participants the possibility of upside potential should the bank rate rise.
As shown in Table 1.4 (Panel B), the Medisave account return was raised in October
2001 to the SA rate, to help members build up the Medisave balance faster.
[Table 1.4 here]
Since the system’s inception 50 years ago, the “default” investment under the
Provident Scheme has always been the CPF fund, so that workers would earn whatever
rate of return was set by the CPF Board as explained above. Nevertheless, over time,
participants have been permitted to use some of their OA and SA assets for other
purposes.

In 1968, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew introduced the Home

Ownership Scheme (HOS), which permitted workers to borrow against CPF
accumulations for the purchase of public housing built under the auspices of the
Housing Development Board (the government authority controlling most of the island’s

8

See http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/Int-Rates/Int-Rates.htm.
Asher (1999) notes that this rate is set as a weighted average of the 12-month deposit rate (80%) and
last-month savings deposit rate (20%) subject to a minimum 2.5% nominal return, revised quarterly. He
also argues that actual CPF returns probably returned 5% on average, on an internationally invested asset
pool of about S$60B over the last decade, though no firm data are provided on the investment mix and
returns of the CPF portfolio.
9

5

housing stock). 10 In 1978, CPF savers were permitted to purchase shares in the
Singapore Bus Service Scheme, and in 1981, private home purchase was permitted with
CPF funds. As of 1986, members were allowed to purchase commercial properties with
their CPF savings and also to move into the Approved Investment Scheme arrangement
(CPF Board 2005e). Subsequently, in 1993, the Board instituted an Investment Schemes
(IS) approach which further widened the range of permissible assets in which CPF
savers could invest. At first members were permitted to invest only a portion of their
OA and SA savings in approved assets, but the portion was raised to 100% for the SA
as of 2001.11
The range of products in which CPF members can invest is quite diverse. In
2006, for instance, OA funds could be invested in fixed deposits, corporate bonds,
property funds and equities traded on the Singapore stock exchange, bonds guaranteed
by the Singapore government, Statutory Board bonds, annuities and endowments,
investment-linked insurance products, unit trusts, exchange traded funds, fund
management accounts and gold. Portfolio limits apply to specific asset families; for
instance, as noted in Table 1.5, a participant can invest only up to 10% of his investible
saving in gold, and only up to 35% of his investible saving in shares, property
funds/REITs, and corporate bonds. A slightly narrower set of investment products has
been allowed for Special Account monies; the list most notably excludes fund
management accounts, shares, property funds/ REITS, corporate bonds, gold,
investment-linked insurance products, unit trusts and exchange traded funds in the
10

See McCarthy et al. (2002), CPF (2005e), and Low and Aw (1997) for further discussion of the
housing loan arrangements.
11
For details see http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/investment/CPF-Invscheme.htm.

6

Higher Risk category of the CPFIS Risk Classification System. The list of financial
service providers currently allowed under the CPF Investment Scheme appears in Table
1.6. Mandatory savings are made to three accounts, namely the Ordinary, Special, and
Medisave funds.

At year-end 2005, CPF members held some S$120B (or about

US$74B) allocated roughly half to the Ordinary Account, 17% in the Special Account,
29% in a medical care savings account, and the rest in “Retirement and Other” (see
Figure 1.3). Total cumulative contributions to the CPF scheme since inception stood at
S$268.8B (as of 05 Financial Year End).
[Tables 1.5 and 1.6, and Figure 1.3 here]
Table 1.7 and Figure 1.4 show, on a cumulative basis, that some 59% of OA
savings have been utilized for housing and 12% for investment. This implies that about
29% of cumulative contributions have remained in the OA fund, where they currently
earn 2.5% annual (nominal) interest. The reverse is true for the funds in the SA, where
account holders have left the bulk of their saving (80%) deposited with the CPF. A
possible explanation for the strong tendency of investors to leave their SA money with
the CPF is that the SA has traditionally paid a higher return compared to the OA. In
addition, account holders may be less willing to assume higher risk for their retirement
accounts. Further detail on how CPF members deployed their funds over the years is
provided in Figure 1.5. It shows that the bulk of the CPF saving (44%) has gone to the
purchase of residential and investment properties. A sizeable portion (29% of
cumulative CPF funds) remains in the OA and SA earning guaranteed interest.
[Table 1.7, and Figures 1.4 and 1.5 here]

7

Currently, about 55% of active members invest in the CPFIS scheme in their OA
accounts, though only about 10% of total accumulated saving has thus far been devoted
to investment instruments and insurance linked products. Panel A in Figure 1.6 shows
that, of funds in the CPFIS-OA investment scheme, 63% is held in insurance products,
25% is invested in shares and 11% is in unit trusts. Interestingly, the negligible 0.64%
held in other instruments such as fixed deposits, bonds, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs),
gold, property funds, and fund management accounts, suggests that most investors do
not fully utilize the menu of investment options they have been offered. Panel B in
Figure 1.6 shows that in the CPFIS-SA investment scheme, on the other hand, most
participants held insurance products to the tune of 86% of their saving. Remaining
funds (14%) were invested primarily in unit trusts. In other words, the asset allocation
patterns of OA and SA monies have been starkly different to date: participants seem
prepared to take more risk with their OA funds compared to their SA saving. It would
appear that the SA funds are put in a separate “mental account” targeted to retirement
and are not generally actively managed.12
[Figure 1.6 here]

1.2 Asset Allocation Patterns in CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS)
Next we develop a more detailed view of CPFIS asset allocation patterns,
focusing on age, sex, and income patterns; the analysis is based on aggregate data as

12

The data in Figures 1.7-1.10 refer to a September year-end, which differs from the December year-end
data given in CPF Annual Reports.

8

individual-account records are not available for research. 13 Figure 1.7 shows that
participants who elected to invest outside the CPF default fund committed most of their
funds to three investment instruments, namely, insurance products, shares, and unit
trusts. Both men and women devoted similar percentages of their money to unit trusts,
and both invested less in instruments such as gold, bonds, fixed deposits, ETFs, and
property funds. Yet men tended to be slightly more proactive in their investments: they
invested 28% of their funds in shares, compared to 21% for women. Conversely,
women were more likely to opt for insurance products (68%), compared to men (60%).
This is similar to US research on retirement account holders, which finds that higher
income men tend to seek riskier investments and trade more in their accounts (Mitchell
et al. 2005).
[Figure 1.7 here]
It is also of interest to ask whether investment behavior becomes less risky as
workers age. Only a partial picture is available as we have information only on the
CPFIS-OA accounts but not participants’ entire portfolios. Nevertheless, Figure 1.8
shows that CPF investors appear more rather than less devoted to risky investments as
they age. Thus, the mature (56+) age group commits a higher proportion to stock
investments and less to insurance products, compared to younger age-groups. We also
find that the youngest workers are more likely to delegate portions of their saving
accounts to investments managed by professionals, as seen from their higher holdings
13

These tabulations as of 2004 were kindly provided by the CPF Board. To date no data have been made
available on the broader investment portfolios of individual investors; accordingly we can report asset
allocation of investors in the CPF-IS scheme but we cannot link the IS accounts to CPF holdings to
ascertain workers’ overall portfolios. Future research will attempt to match individual records to evaluate
the larger picture of IS versus non-IS holdings.

9

of unit trusts (14%); by contrast, the mature group tends to invest more heavily in shares
on their own. In data not shown, older women prove slightly more conservative,
investing more in insurance products than men. These general patterns again conform to
US findings, where higher income, older men are more likely to hold riskier portfolios
as compared their female and younger counterparts - and trade more, as well, often to
their detriment (Mitchell et al. 2006).
[Figure 1.8 here]
Another perspective is offered in Figure 1.9, which displays investment scheme
asset allocation patterns by risk category and participant salary levels. We group the
CPFIS products into three, namely insurance products, relatively less risky products
(bond and fixed deposits), and relatively more risky products (which include shares,
unit trusts, exchange traded funds, gold and property funds).14 The income categories
we tabulate focus on low earners (earning less than S$1,500/mo.), low-middle (S$15003,500/mo.), high-middle (S$3,500-6,000/mo.), and high (S$6,000+/mo.).15 Here we see
that low and lower-middle earners are less likely to hold risky investments, with at least
70% of their CPFIS portfolios held in insurance products. As salary levels rise, the
fraction in insurance products falls, first to 63%, and then to under 50% for the highest
earners. Conversely, higher-earners hold between one-third and half of their investment
accounts in risky forms, a finding consistent with international research (Mitchell et al.
2005).

14

In future work we hope to disaggregate the insurance products into investment-linked products, which
are likely more risky than endowment funds.
15
Retirees and non-retirees with no monthly earnings are excluded as the data do not allow us to
distinguish between these two groups.
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[Figure 1.9 here]
Overall, the observed regularity is that people who move their funds to the
CPFIS system tend to buy insurance products, and this holds across age, sex, and
income groups. This is not due to preferential tax treatment on income received from
insurance products, since investment profits and interest earned from investments, most
dividends, and income received from CPFIS annuities paid directly as cash, are
currently not taxable. 16 Rather, it may be that in Singapore as elsewhere, insurance
agents are successfully able to emphasize the joint appeal of protection and investment
(especially for investment-linked insurance products), which seems particularly
attractive for CPF money that cannot be accessed until the age of 55.

1.3 Analyzing the Impact of Fees and Charges for CPFIS Options
As noted above, additional investment choices have been added over the years,
to the menu of funds into which CPF participants may invest their mandatory savings.
As of 2006, there were some 400 investment portfolios on offer to CPF participants.
Naturally, this additional diversity of fund choices imposes on participants the
responsibility to devote more attention to the risks and benefits of diversifying outside
the traditional CPF fund managed by the government. Diversification into other assets
outside the traditional CPF portfolio also brings with it the potential for high
management fees and commissions associated with having many small funds.
With such a rich offering of investment options, it is of interest to inquire
whether CPFIS participants have been successful in growing their retirement saving.
16

As per mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/Investment/INV.htm.
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Recently the story has not an encouraging one, as shown in Table 1.8 (for Fiscal Years
2004-2006). Here almost half of CPFIS-OA investors (48%) incurred losses from
investing on average, while one-third realized profits equal to or less than the default
OA rate of 2.5%. Only one-fifth of the investors made net realized profits in excess of
the OA interest rate. This poor investment performance has not gone unnoticed by
policymakers. Indeed Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long expressed concern in 2005
regarding the CPFIS scheme, pointing to high investment fees and expenses as an
explanation for low returns:
“[W]e must help CPF members to earn better long term returns on their
savings. Over the years, we have opened up the CPF Investment Scheme
(CPFIS) and given members considerable latitude to invest their CPF
savings as they judge best. However, this has not always worked out as well
as we hoped, because the options available to the members are not well
tailored to their needs, and it is difficult to educate members adequately on
how to plan for their long term needs. Almost three-quarters of the members
who invested under CPFIS from 1993 to 2004 would have been better off
leaving their savings with the Board. In particular, those who invested in
unit trusts and investment-linked products (ILPs) have generally received
mediocre returns. One important reason why CPFIS returns have been
mediocre is the high cost of investing. For example, the annual cost to
investors in a retail unit trust in Singapore is typically double that of the US.
This is because the market is fragmented, many of the unit trusts and ILPs
are small, and the overheads and fees are high.” (CPF 2005f).
[Table 1.8 here]
To explore the range of charges levied under the CPF investment schemes, we
assembled Table 1.9 from the CPF Board’s website, which presents a rather bewildering
array of fees for different investments and a wide diversity of front end commissions,
back end loads, and annual service charges. For instance, the holder of a unit trust may
pay sales charges, transaction fees, service charges, annual fund operations fees,
performance fees, and sometimes redemption charges. Purchasers of investment-linked
12

insurance products also pay transaction and service fees as well as sales charges,
expense ratios, performance fees, and redemption charges. Compared to the US
institutional market, there would appear to be far more diversity and complexity in the
Singapore case (Mitchell 1998).
[Table 1.9 here]
As these may be perplexing to many participants, we next turn to an evaluation
of how such costs can impact the return of retirement savings for a typical CPF-IS unit
trust investor over different time horizons. Our strategy is to isolate the impact of costs
from returns, allowing us to compute the rate of return that an investor requires so as to
‘cost-recover’ the expenses over different time horizons. Accordingly, in what follows,
we develop a “hurdle rate” notion which asks what the investor’s net return would have
to be, after costs, so the investor would do better than simply defaulting his money into
the government-run fund. Specifically, we simulate the effect of transaction costs on an
investment of $1 held for 1 year (short term), 5 years (medium term), and 10-20 years
(long-term), after subtracting cost components of the unit trust investments. In the
simulation, we assume that the prices of unit trusts remain unchanged so the change in
the fund position reflects solely cost impacts; we also assume that management fee and
other annual operating costs are fixed at the current average rates relevant to the four
fund types appearing in Table 1.10: equity, balanced, income and money market funds
(based on Mercer’s risk classification system). 17 Average costs by fund types are

17

Different unit trusts may have different investment objectives, different styles of management and
different levels of equity risk depending on their portfolio allocation. This is recognized by Mercer
Investment Consulting, CPF Board’s consultant, which has developed a risk classification system for the
CPFIS that assigns various risk levels to permitted investments. The unit trust or ILP with a greater
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presented in Table 1.10 from a sample of 235 unit trusts representing 97% of the CPFIS
unit trust universe (as of 30 June 2006).
[Table 1.10 here]
These average transaction costs by fund type are applied to a $1 investment held
for various time periods assuming the fund earns a zero rate of return.18 For year 1, we
apply both the one-off sales load and annual operating costs, where the sales load
comprises both front-end and back-end sales charges, while operating costs include fees
for management, custodian, trustee, administration, and other major fees paid by the
unit trust out of the fund’s net asset value; the performance fee is excluded.19 Thereafter
annual charges are subtracted as relevant. Table 1.11 (Panel A) summarizes the results,
where we see that the $1 investment steadily eroded by annual operating costs assuming
zero returns. For the 10-year holding period, the $1 invested in the average equity fund
would be predicted to shrink to $0.772, sliding further to $0.626 by Year 20. Expenses
are lower for income funds: the same $1 invested there would be worth $0.874 in Year
10 and $0.781 by Year 20. Using these results, we next compute the annual rate of
return required for the investor to ‘cost-recover’ for each fund type, which appear in
Table 1.11 (Panel B). Not surprisingly, a longer holding period is beneficial in that a

proportion of its assets invested in the more volatile stock market will have a higher equity risk. Based on
its level of equity risk, a unit trust or Investment Linked Product is assigned one of the four risk
categories.
18
Of course investors may consider both fund performance and costs simultaneously, though doing so
may be distortive since fund performance is uncertain and fluctuates widely, while transaction costs can
be estimated with a fair amount of certainty.
19
These are estimated using the total expense ratio publicly reported by Investment Management
Association of Singapore (IMAS). Expense ratios are supposed to be calculated according to IMAS
guidelines (see IMAS 2005), and they are furnished by fund management companies and insurers and
made available to the public through the quarterly Performance and Risk Monitoring Reports for CPFISincluded funds published by Standard & Poor / CPF and found on IMAS website.
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lower rate of return is needed to ‘cost-recover.’ This is mainly because the one-off sales
loads are spread over a longer period.
[Table 1.11 here]
To complete the picture, we then compute the minimum hurdle rate of return
that a fund must generate if it is to beat the guaranteed returns attainable by leaving
one’s money in the government-managed account, currently, 2.5% and 4% for OA and
SA monies, respectively. Results for CPFIS unit trusts are provided in Table 1.11 (Panel
C), where over a 1-year period, the OA hurdle rate ranges from 3.3% for money market
funds, to 9.4% for equity funds. Over a 20-year period they range from 3.2% for the
money market funds to 4.8% for equity funds. For SA account holders over the same 1year period, the hurdle rate is 4.8% for money market funds and 10.9% for equity funds.
Over a 20-year time frame, it is 4.7% for money market and 6.3% for equity funds.
Such high threshold returns may rationalize why so many CPF accountholders leave
their investible funds in the default OA and SA accounts.

1.4 Lowering Costs for CPFIS Investors
In recent years, steps have been taken to better inform members about
investment options and expense ratios. For instance, the Investment Management
Association of Singapore (IMAS) recently published standardized cost formulae across
funds (www.fundsingapore.com). Nevertheless CPF members must still factor in
additional investment costs not commonly wrapped into expense ratios, including backand/or front-end loads, annual asset-based and fixed charges, and wrap fees; these have
yet to be collated into an easy-to-understand format.
15

In late 2005, the CPF Board announced several requirements for funds seeking
to be newly included in the CPFIS menu; one change was such funds would be required
to meet a higher relative performance standard than previously required, such that the
fund had to have a minimum of a 3-year performance record that could not fall below
the top 25 percentile of funds in a global peer group.20 As this standard exceeds the
older benchmark of top 50 percentile, it is likely to represent an improvement over past
practice. Nevertheless, some degree of subjectivity remains as the evaluators take into
account the fund managers’ capabilities, the fund’s investment philosophy, the quality
of the fund’s research and analysis; and the way the fund constructs and implements its
portfolio. Furthermore, funds already on the CPFIS permitted list are not held to these
new standards. A second change adopted by the Board in late 2005 was the explicit
introduction of expense ratio targets for the first time. The expectation is that: “[t]he
CPF Board will therefore …(induce) lower cost ratios, enhance transparency to help
members make informed choices, and encourage consolidation among the funds to
achieve greater economies of scale.”21 Specifically, any new fund must have an expense
ratio below the median of existing CPFIS funds in its risk category. In practice this
implies that so-called ‘higher risk’ funds investing mainly in equities will be held to a
cap of 1.95 percent of assets per year; ‘medium to high’ risk funds holding both equities
and bonds must charge less than 1.75 percent of assets; ‘low to medium’ risk funds
investing in bonds or fixed income must charge less than 1.15 percent pa; and ‘lower
risk’ funds (money market funds) cannot exceed an annual expense ratio of 0.65 percent
20

See CPF (2005d), though it is not easy to determine which specific funds constitute each global peer
group by asset class/strategy.
21
Source: CPF (2005f).
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(CPF 2005d). While a full-scale comparison of these expense ratios with international
charges is beyond the purview of this paper, it is clear that the CPF costs are still not on
the low side. For instance, a recent review of US fund expenses found that the assetweighted average expense ratio for stock funds was 1.13 percent, and for bond funds at
0.9 percent in 2005 (ICI, 2006) – and these figures include a pro-rata share of front-end
loads. Furthermore, most US investors held their money in lower-cost funds.
Consequently, adopting an expense target as in Singapore is a positive step, though
focusing on the median fund charge in Singapore, exclusive of front end loads, may still
produce costs that are high by developed-country standards.
The issue of fees and charges remains one of national concern, as evidenced by
a recent CPF Board statement that in the future, front load charges will be capped at 3
percent (as of 7/1/07) in addition to the already announced expense ratio caps (from
1/1/08) (CPF 2006a). This is a significant reduction from the 5 percent front load often
charged by CPFIS funds in the past, and these changes represent positive steps to bring
the cost of CPF Investment Scheme nearer to developed country standards.

1.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Singapore has one of the world’s lowest fertility rates (at around 1.2 per
1,000),22 and longest life expectancies (over age 80 at birth),23 so this nation is aging
quickly. Indeed, in the next two decades, it will overtake all but Japan in its fraction of
population elderly. Accordingly, it is valuable to assess how the Singaporean Central
22

The Singapore fertility rate in 2000 was reported as 1.2 by the US Census Bureau (www.census.gov).
Singaporean sources place it a little higher, at around 1.6, but declining (SDOS 2006).
23
See for instance, Clark (1999).
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Provident Fund (CPF) might become more effective in building retiree wealth. Thus far,
it appears that the bulk of workers’ saving (44%) has gone to purchase homes, leading
to an asset rich, cash poor phenomenon (McCarthy et al. 2002). We have also shown
that contributors tend to default their remaining saving to the CPF government-managed
investment pool. The few participants who elect outside investment products tend to be
high-income males, rather than lower paid workers and women. High expenses and
fees, as well as inertia, rationalize why few CPF account holders invest outside the
default government investment pool.
More attention could be devoted to lowering fund expenses and commissions in
the CPFIS system. It would be useful to aggregate the myriad of data on fees, expenses,
loads, wrap fees, and other charges as they are dispersed across numerous websites and
expressed in different terms depending on the specific product in question. It could be
helpful for the CPF to develop a single easy-to-use web calculator making these
comparisons simpler. For instance, a drop list could illustrate for each fund the
component costs over a range of holding periods. It would be useful to show itemized
costs well as an all-in annualized cost, for the various products projected over various
periods (e.g. 1, 5, 10, 20 years).
It might also be beneficial to streamline and rationalize the investment menu
offered to participants. Currently more than 400 funds are offered to CPF investors, but
this list includes few index-linked funds, ETFs, or life-cycle funds, and no inflation
protected instruments are currently on offer. 24 Furthermore, while new funds are

24

It would also be of interest to offer inflation-indexed bonds, as these make good sense for the
retirement decumulation phase (Brown et al. 2000).
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screened for cost efficiency, more stringent criteria might be adopted to screen out
under-performing existing funds at regular intervals.
It might be useful to consider consolidating participants’ investments to bring
about more competition to drive down costs. One interesting development in this
context is the advent of low-cost Life Cycle funds which might be adopted as the
“default” investment mix for otherwise naïve or underconfident investors. Employees
could then be automatically defaulted into a balanced fund based on their age, unless
they actively select some other investment portfolio. In Chile, for instance, pension
managers offer up to five funds, ranging from “Fund A” which holds 80% of the
portfolio in equities, to “Fund E” which holds 100% fixed income; “Funds B-D” hold
intermediate percentages in equities. Active workers may elect up to two funds at a
time offered by a single money manager, and they will be automatically transitioned to
more conservative portfolios as they age, unless they elect otherwise (Arenas de Mesa
et al. forthcoming). A low-cost Life Cycle approach might be useful in the Singaporean
case, in view of many affiliates’ inertia regarding investment choices.
It could also be useful and important to educate CPF investors regarding capital
market risk and return, as the government seeks to streamline the range of investment
choices and bring down expenses.

The US experience with investment education

suggests that even relatively well-educated subjects can have a hard time understanding
and acting on information regarding mutual fund charges (Choi et al. 2005; Lusardi and
Mitchell 2006). To the extent that individual investors are poorly equipped to make
investment choices in their retirement accounts, this will place greater burden on
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policymakers’ shoulders to fashion the best possible environment for strengthening
retirement security.
Finally, policymakers may seek to restrain the amount of retirement saving
going into property purchases so that CPF participants have sufficient funds to finance
their retirement years. An alternative may be for the financial sector to spur the growth
of reverse mortgages permitting homes to be pledged to financial institutions, in return
for a retirement annuity; this is made complex by the fact that most (85%) homeowners
purchase housing development flats (public housing) on leasehold from the government.
Another option might be to allow homeowners to freely rent out their apartments for
income; while steps are being taken in this direction, numerous restrictions remain on
the use of these apartments, including rental. Removing these restrictions may alleviate
the asset rich, cash poor syndrome.
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Table 1.1: Annual Earnings Ceiling for CPF Contributions
Year

Salary Ceiling

2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997

$4,500
$5,000
$5,500
$6,000
$6,000
$6,000
$6,000
$6,000
$6,000
$6,000

Source: CPF Annual Reports, various years (http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/cpf/about-us/ann-rpt/ann_rep
ort.htm).
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Table 1.2: Contribution Rates to CPF Ordinary and Special Accounts over
Time: % of Covered Earnings (workers age 35-45)

As of

Ordinary
Account (OA)

Special Account
(SA)

OA + SA
Together

Jul-55 °
Sep-68 °
Jan-70 °
Jan-71 °
Jul-72 °
Jul-73 °
Jul-74 °
Jul-75 ° *
Jul-77
Jul-78
Jul-79
Jul-80
Jul-81
Jul-82
Jul-83
Jul-84
Jul-85 **
Apr-86
Jul-88
Jul-89
Jul-90
Jul-91
Jul-92
Jul-93
Jul-94
Jan-99
Apr-00
Jan-01
Oct-03
Jan-05
Jan-06

10
13
16
20
24
26
30
30
30
30
30
32
38.5
40
40
40
40
29
30
30
30
30
29
29
29
23
23
23
20
20
20

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
7
6.5
4
5
6
4
4
0
0
2
3.5
4
4
4
4
0
2
6
6
6
6

10
13
16
20
24
26
30
30
31
33
37
38.5
42.5
45
46
44
44
29
30
32
33.5
34
33
33
33
23
25
29
26
26
26

Notes:
° Single pooled account
* Maximum contribution increased from $450 to $600 per month
** Maximum contribution increased from $2,500 to $3,000 per month
Source: CPF Annual Report 2005 and http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/Con-Rates/
ContriRa.htm.
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Table 1.3: Contributions and Balances in the CPF
A. Member CPF Annual Contributions and Year-End Account Balances Through Time
(S$ Billions)
Year

Contributions ($B)

Account Balances ($B)

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

10.4
11.3
13.5
14.6
15.9
16.0
12.8
14.1
18.3
16.2
15.9
15.3
16.1

52.3
57.6
66.0
72.6
79.7
85.3
88.4
90.3
92.2
96.4
103.5
111.9
119.8

Source: CPF Annual Report, 2005.

B. Member Balances by Account: 2005
S$B

%

Ordinary Account
Special Account
Medisave Account
Retirement Account & Others

$58.6
$20.1
$34.8
$6.4

49%
17%
29%
5%

Total Members’ Balance

$119.8

100%

Source: CPF (2005a).
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Table 1.4: CPF Interest Rates over Time
A. CPF Interest Rate Paid on All Accounts: 1955-1995
Year

Interest Rate Per
Annum (%)

1955 – 1962
1963
1964 – 1966
1967 – 1969
1970 – 1973
1974 – Feb 1986
Mar-Jun 1986
Jul-Dec 1986
Jan-Jun 1987
Jul 1987 – Dec 1987
Jan-Jun 1988
Jul-Dec 1988

Year

2.5
5
5.25
5.5
5.75
6.5
5.78
5.38
4.34
3.31
3.19
2.96

Interest Rate Per
Annum (%)

Jan-Jun 1989
Jul-Dec 1989
Jan-Jun 1990
Jul-Dec 1990
Jan-Jun 1991
Jul-Dec 1991
Jan-Jun 1992
Jul-Dec 1992
Jan-Jun 1993
Jul 1993 – Dec 1994
Jan-Jun 1995

3.1
3.39
3.77
3.88
4.85
4.54
4.59
3.31
2.62
2.5
3.1

B. Higher CPF Interest Rates Paid Mid-1995 onwards for Special, Retirement, and
Medisave Accounts
Year
From 1 July 1995
Jul-Dec 1995
Jan-Jun 1996
Jul 1996 – Jun 1998
Jul-Dec 1998
Jan-Jun 1999
Jul 1999 – Sep 2001
From 1 October 2001
Oct 2001 – Dec 2006

Interest Rate Per Annum (%)
Ordinary and
Medisave Accounts
3.82
3.52
3.48
4.29
4.41
2.5

Special and
Retirement Accounts
5.07
4.77
4.73
5.79
5.91
4

Ordinary
Account
2.5

Medisave, Special and
Retirement Accounts
4

Notes:
1. The Special Account, Medisave Account and Retirement Account were introduced in July 1977, April 1984, and
January 1987 respectively.
2. From 1955 to 1976, CPF interests were credited and compounded annually.
3. From 1977 to 1985, CPF interests were credited quarterly and compounded annually.
4. From 1986 to present, CPF interests are computed monthly and compounded and credited annually.
5. From 1 July 1999, CPF interests are reviewed quarterly.
Source: http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/Int-Rates/Int-Rates_Arc.asp
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Table 1.5: Financial Instruments Available for Investment in the CPF Ordinary
and Special Accounts
CPFIS-OA

CPFIS-SA

Full Ordinary Account savings can be invested in:
Fixed Deposits
Singapore Government Bonds
Statutory Board Bonds
Bonds Guaranteed by Singapore Government
Annuities
Endowment Insurance Policies
Investment-linked Insurance Products
Unit Trusts
Exchange Traded Funds
Fund Management Accounts
Up to 35% of investible savings# can be invested in:
Shares
Property Funds (or real estate investment trusts)
Corporate Bonds

Full Special Account savings can be
invested in:
Fixed Deposits
Singapore Government Bonds
Statutory Board Bonds (Secondary
Market only)
Bonds Guaranteed by Singapore
Government
Annuities
Endowment Insurance Policies
Selected Investment-Linked
Insurance Products*
Selected Unit Trusts*
Selected Exchange Traded Funds*

Up to 10% of investible savings# can be invested in:
Gold (currently only UOB offers new gold
investments)
Notes:
# Investible savings refer to the net Ordinary Account balance after withdrawals for education and
investment.
* Those found in the lowest three tiers of the CPFIS Risk Classification System Table unless otherwise
stated. The risk classification tables for unit trusts, investment-linked insurance products and exchange
traded funds can be found at www.cpf.gov.sg/cpf_info/Benefits/Asset/Assetenh.asp.
Annuities, endowment insurance policies, investment-linked insurance products must be offered by
insurance companies included under CPFIS. For endowment policies, maturity date must not be later
than the member's 62nd birthday. Unit trusts and investment-linked insurance products must be managed
by Fund Management Companies included under CPFIS. Fund managers are required to invest according
to the Investment Guidelines set by CPF Board. Exchange traded funds must meet guidelines set by CPF
Board and be listed on the Singapore Exchange-Securities Trading. Fund managers of fund management
accounts are required to invest according to the Investment Guidelines set by CPF Board. Shares of
Companies, Units of Property Funds or Property Trusts and Corporate Bonds (CPFIS-OA only) must be
offered by companies incorporated in Singapore. Also, they must be fully paid ordinary or preference
shares or corporate bonds listed on the Singapore Exchange-Securities Trading (SGX-ST).
Source: http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/Investment/INV.htm
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Table 1.6: Service and Product Providers Included Under the CPFIS
Other Companies

Fund Management Companies

Fixed Deposit Banks:
1. DBS Bank Ltd
2. Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation
Ltd
3. United Overseas Bank Ltd

1. Aberdeen Asset Management Asia Ltd
2. ABN AMRO Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd
3. AIG Global Investment Corporation (Singapore)
Ltd
4. Alliance Capital Management (Singapore) Ltd
5. Allianz Global Investors Singapore Limited
6. APS Asset Management Pte Ltd
7. AXA Rosenberg Investment Mgmt Asia Pacific
Ltd
8. Capital International Research & Management
Inc
9. Commerzbank Asset Management Asia Ltd
10. Credit Agricole Asset Management Singapore
Ltd
11. DBS Asset Management Ltd2
12. Deutsche Asset Management (Asia) Ltd
13. Fidelity Investments (Singapore) Limited
14. First State Investments (Singapore)2
15. Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte Ltd
16. Henderson Global Investors (Singapore) Ltd
17. HSBC Investments (Singapore) Ltd2
18. ING Investment Mgmt Asia Pacific (Singapore)
Pte Ltd
19. INVESCO Asset Management Singapore Ltd
20. Legg Mason Asset Management (Asia) Pte Ltd
21. Lion Capital Management Ltd
22. NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative Ltd1
23. Prudential Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd
24. Schroder Investment Management (Singapore)
Ltd2
25. SG Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd
26. State Street Global Advisors Singapore Ltd
27. Templeton Asset Management Ltd
28. UBS Global Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd
29. UOB Asset Management Ltd2

Insurance Companies:
1. American International Assurance Co Ltd
2. Asia Life Assurance Society Ltd
3. Aviva Ltd
4. AXA Life Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd
5. Great Eastern Life Assurance Co Ltd
6. HSBC Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd
7. Manulife (Singapore) Pte Ltd
8. NTUC Income Insurance Co-operative
Ltd
9. Overseas Assurance Corporation Ltd
10. Prudential Assurance Co Singapore Pte
Ltd
11. UOB Life Assurance Ltd
Investment Administrators:
1. dollarDEX Investments Pte Ltd
2. iFAST Financial Pte Ltd
3. Navigator Investment Services Ltd

Notes:
1. Can only manage investment-linked insurance sub-funds under CPFIS unlike the rest of the FMCs
which can manage unit trusts, ILP funds/ sub-funds, exchange traded funds and fund management
accounts under CPFIS.
2. FMCs which offer Fund Management Account services.
Source: http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/Investment/INV-Asset-Enhance.htm.
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Table 1.7: Cumulative Use of CPF Funds as of End 2005
Fund Balances and Total Withdrawals

Amount (S$B)

Fund Balance:
OA
SA
Medisave
Retirement & Others

119.78
58.57
20.05
34.76
6.40

Education Scheme Withdrawal

0.50

Investment Schemes Withdrawal
CPFIS-OA
CPFIS-SA

27.90
22.91
4.99

Special Discounted Shares Scheme

1.92

Property Scheme withdrawal
(public, residential & non-residential properties
schemes)

117.38

Note: Net amount withdrawn under Medishield, Medisave, Home Protection, Dependent Protection,
Minimum Sum, Section 15 & 25 withdrawals not included.
Source: Data kindly provided by the CPF Board.
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Table 1.8: Realized Profits/Losses for Investments Held Under the CPFIS
Ordinary Account (FY04-06)

Members who made net realized profits
in excess of the OA interest rate of 2.5%
%
Members who made realized profits,
but equal to or less than OA rate
%
Members who made realized losses
%

FY 2006

FY 2005

FY 2004

1 Oct 05 30 Sept 06

1 Oct 04 30 Sept 05

1 Oct 03 30 Sept 04

3-year
average

180,000

147,000

128,000

23%

19%

17%

257,000

250,000

240,000

32%

33%

33%

33%

362,000
45%

363,000
48%

370,000
50%

48%

20%

Note: Constructed from CPFIS Profits/ Losses for the Financial Year ended 31 September 2005 & 2006.
Source: CPF (2005c) and mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/D324F161-1F6A-4699-A6BA-C5ACA0E11C
5F/0/IE_re portpl.pdf.
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Table 1.9: Charges Incurred for Investments under the CPFIS
Type of Investments

Agent Bank's Charges
(under CPFIS-OA)

Other Charges1
(under CPFIS-OA & CPFIS-SA)

Fixed Deposit (FD)

Transaction Fee
$2/FD placement/refund of
proceeds upon FD maturity or
termination
Service Charge
$2/FD/quarter, min. charge
between $2-5.

Other Charges
NA

Shares, Bonds (incl.
Statutory Board
Bonds) & Listed
Property Trusts/
Funds traded on
SGX

Transaction Fee
$2-$2.50 per lot, max of $20-$25/
transaction
Service Charge
$2/counter/quarter, w. min. charge
between $2-5.

Broker's commission2
0.4-0.5% of trade contract value,
subject to min of $40/trade
Central Depository (Pte) Ltd’s fees
1) Clearing fee of 0.05% on trade
contract value, subject to max of
$200. 2) $0.50/transaction

Singapore
Government Bonds
& Statutory Board
Bonds traded
through bonddealers

Transaction Fee
$2-$2.50/lot, max of $20-$25/
transaction
Service Charge
$2/counter/quarter, w. min. charge
$2-5.

Bond-Dealer's Charges
$0-50 per transaction

Investment-linked
Insurance Products

Transaction Fee
Between $2-$2.50/transaction.
Service Charge
$2/policy/quarter, w. min. charge
$2-5.

Sales Charge
Between 0-5% (reflected in bid-offer
spread3) and 1- 5.75% of premium
paid and/or $0-$150/ single premium
policy
Expense Ratio4
0.3-4.4% of NAV5
Redemption Charge
0-7% of NAV and/or $0-$42.75.
Annual Performance Fees
0-20% of excess returns over
benchmark for underlying fund.
Insurance Administration /Coverage
Charges
$0-5/month per policy.
Surrender Charges
0-4% of the surrender value.

Endowment Policies
and Annuities (Single
Premium Type)

Transaction Fee
$2-$2.50/transaction.
Service Charge
$2/policy/quarter, min. charge of
$2-5.

Total Distribution Cost (TDC)6
1-6.2% of Single Premium
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Type of Investments
Unit Trusts7

Agent Bank's Charges
(under CPFIS-OA)
Transaction Fee
$2-2.50/lot, max of $20-25/
transaction.
Service Charge
$2/unit trust fund/quarter, min.
charge between $2-5.

Other Charges1
(under CPFIS-OA & CPFIS-SA)
Sales Charge
0-5% (reflected in the bid offer
spread) of initial amount invested.
Expense Ratio8
0-7.1% of NAV
Redemption Charge
0-6% of NAV
Annual Performance Fees
0-30% of excess returns over
benchmark for unit trust

Notes:
1
These charges are estimates only and may not be exhaustive. CPF members are advised to check with the product
providers on the full range of charges payable. Charges also exclude GST, unless otherwise stated.
2
Broking fees are fully liberalized now and the charges depend on the broking houses. The broker's commission
mentioned is the range that majority of the broking houses are charging.
3
Bid-offer spread is the difference between the price at which the product is offered for sale ("offer") and the price at
which the product provider will redeem the product ("bid")
4
Includes Annual Management Fees which range from 0.10% to 1.85% of NAV
5
Net Asset Value (NAV) is the total market value of the securities in a fund's portfolio divided by the number of units
currently outstanding
6
Total Distribution Cost (TDC) refers to the total costs that an insurance company is expected to incur and includes
commissions and cost of benefits and services paid to the distribution channel
7
Generally, online fund distributors charge lower front-end fees than brick-and-mortar distributors like banks and
brokerages.
8
Includes Annual Management Fees which may range from 0% to 3% of NAV.
Source: http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/Investment/INV.htm.
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Table 1.10: Sales Loads and Expense Ratios for CPFIS Unit Trusts
Risk category
Higher risk
Medium-high risk
Low-medium risk
Lower risk
Total N Funds

Type of fund

# Funds

Equity
Balanced
Income
Cash

167
26
39
3
235

Average
sales load

Average
expense ratios

4.9%
4.8%
2.1%
0.1%

2.07%
1.93%
1.12%
0.71%

Note: The sales load comprises both front-end and back-end sales charges. Annual operating costs
comprise fees for management, custodian, trustee, administration, and other major fees paid by the unit
trust out of the fund’s net asset value, and is estimated using the total expense ratio publicly reported by
Investment Management Association of Singapore under its Fund Information Service website
(www.fundsingapore.com).
Source: Authors' computations using fund prospectuses and IMAS-reported expense ratios as at 30 Jun
2006.
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Table 1.11: Simulation Study of Impact of Fund Expenses by Fund Type for
Alternative Holding Periods
A. Fraction of Value Remaining After Expenses Assuming Zero Investment Return, by Fund
Type and Holding Period
Fund type
Equity
Balanced
Income
Money market

Year 1

Year 5

Year 10

Year 20

0.931
0.934
0.968
0.992

0.857
0.864
0.925
0.964

0.772
0.784
0.874
0.930

0.626
0.645
0.781
0.866

B. Percentage of $1 Investment Eroded by Expenses Assuming Zero Investment Return, by
Fund Type and Holding Period (%)
Fund type
Equity
Balanced
Income
Money market

Year 1

Year 5

Year 10

Year 20

-6.9%
-6.6%
-3.2%
-0.8%

-3.0%
-2.9%
-1.5%
-0.7%

-2.6%
-2.4%
-1.3%
-0.7%

-2.3%
-2.2%
-1.2%
-0.7%

C. Minimum Investment Return (Hurdle Rate) Required to Beat CPF Default Interest Rate on
Ordinary Account (OA) and Special Account (SA), by Fund Type and Holding Period
Hurdle rates for OA
Fund type
Equity
Balanced
Income
Money market

Hurdle rates for SA

Year 1

5

10

20

1

5

10

20

9.4%
9.1%
5.7%
3.3%

5.5%
5.4%
4.0%
3.2%

5.1%
4.9%
3.8%
3.2%

4.8%
4.7%
3.7%
3.2%

10.9%
10.6%
7.2%
4.8%

7.0%
6.9%
5.5%
4.7%

6.6%
6.4%
5.3%
4.7%

6.3%
6.2%
5.2%
4.7%

Notes: This simulation study assumes that the prices of unit trusts remain unchanged so the change in the
fund position solely reflects cost impacts on a $1 investment over 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, and 20 years.
Costs include the one-off sales load and the annual operating costs for each of the four fund types as
presented in Table 1.10. The sales load comprises both front-end and back-end sales charges. Annual
operating costs comprise fees for management, custodian, trustee, administration, and other major fees
paid by the unit trust out of the fund's net asset value, and is estimated using the total expense ratio
publicly reported by Investment Management Association of Singapore (IMAS) under its Fund
Information Service website (www.fundsingapore.com). The performance fee is excluded from the total
expense ratio.
Source: Authors' computations using fund prospectuses and CPF (2006).
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Figure 1.1: Central Provident Fund Overview

Employer Contributions

CPF
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• Family Protection

Other purposes:

• Retirement

Source: Adapted from Low and Aw (2004).
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Retirement
& others Account

Figure 1.2: Contribution Shares to CPF OA and SA Accounts over Time: % of
covered earnings (workers age 35 -45)
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Special Acct

Source: Table 1.2
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Figure 1.3: Balances in Specified CPF Accounts
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Source: Table 1.7.
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Figure 1.4: Portion Invested and Balance Remaining in CPF Ordinary and Special
Accounts
A. Portion of Balance Remaining in OA Account vs. Portion Used for Investment

CPFIS-OA
11.52%

Property
withdrawal
59.03%

OA Balance
29.45%

B. Portion of Balance Remaining in SA Account vs. Portion Used for Investment
SA Balance
80.07%

CPFIS-SA
19.93%

Source: Table1.7
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Figure 1.5: Cumulative Use of CPF Funds (OA and SA combined)
Retirem ent & Others
Balance
2.39%

OA Balance
21.90%

Property w ithdraw al
43.88%

SA Balance
7.50%

Medisave Balance
13.00%
Special discounted
shares
0.72%
CPFIS-SA
1.87%

CPFIS-OA
8.57%

Source: Derived from Table 1.7.
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Education w ithdraw al
0.19%

Figure 1.6: Allocation of Investments across CPFIS Accounts
A. CPFIS Ordinary Account
Unit Trusts,
11.10%

Others, 0.64%

Shares,
24.92%
Insurance:
Annuity,
Endowment &
ILPs, 63.35%

B. CPFIS Special Account

Unit Trusts,
13.45%

Others, 0.10%

Insurance:
Annuity,
Endowment &
ILPs, 86.45%

Note: For CPFIS Ordinary Account, “Others” include fixed deposits, bonds, ETFs, gold, property funds,
and fund management accounts. For CPFIS Special Account, “Others” include fixed deposits and bonds
only.
Source: CPF (2005c).
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Figure 1.7: Investment Patterns in CPF Ordinary Accounts by Sex
A. Men
Unit Trusts,
11.33%

Shares,
27.92%
Insurance
Prdts,
60.11%
Others,
0.63%

B. Women
Unit Trusts,
10.76%

Shares,
20.46%

Others, 0.62%

Insurance
Prdts, 68.17%

Note: “Others” include ETFs, gold, fixed deposits, bonds, and property funds.
Source: Data kindly provided by CPF Board; values as of Sept 30, 2005.
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Figure 1.8: Investment Patterns in CPF Ordinary Accounts by Age
A. Young Adult (21 - 35 years)
Unit Trusts,
16.66%

Shares,
7.28%
Others,
0.66%

Insurance
Prdts,
75.40%

B. Middle Age (36 - 55 years)
Unit Trusts,
10.23%

Shares,
27.32%
Insurance
Prdts,
61.84%
Others,
0.61%

C. Mature (≥56 years)
Unit Trusts,
9.78%

Insurance
Prdts, 51.91%

Shares,
37.36%

Others, 0.95%

Notes: “Others” include ETFs, gold, fixed deposits, bonds, and property funds.
Source: Data kindly provided by CPF Board; values are as of Sept 30, 2005.
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Figure 1.9: Investment Patterns in CPF Ordinary Accounts by Risk Type and
Income
A. Low Income (<S$1,500/mth)

B. Low-Middle Income (S$1,501 - 3,500/mth)
Non Risky
0.25%

Non Risky
0.26%
Risky
23.68%

Risky
26.90%

Ins. Prdts
76.07%

Ins. Prdts
72.85%

D. High Income (>S$6,000/mth)

C. Middle-High Income (S$3,500 - 6,000/mth)

Non Risky
0.42%

Non Risky
0.28%

Risky
37.26%
Risky
50.41%

Ins. Prdts
49.17%

Ins. Prdts
62.45%

Note: Participants with positive income only are included. Risk level of insurance products cannot be
evaluated.
Source: Data kindly provided by CPF Board; values as of Sept 30, 2005.
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CHAPTER 2
Longevity Risk Management in Singapore’s National Pension System25

While defined contribution (DC) pensions have enjoyed varying degrees of
success during the accumulation phase, proponents of the DC model now confront the
larger question of how participants will manage their capital throughout the payout
phase so as not to run out of money in retirement. Not surprisingly, governments have
become involved in this decision, as in the case of Switzerland where annuitization is
the default payout modality; given a choice, most retirees elect to annuitize (Bütler and
Teppa 2007). The U.K. has a long history of annuitization for those holding private DC
pension accounts, yet retirees have substantial leeway over how much to annuitize and
when (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002, 2004). And in Chile, workers have long been
given a choice between phased withdrawal and annuitization when they claim their
pensions (Mitchell and Ruiz 2010).
In contrast to such flexibility over annuitization, the Central Provident Fund
(CPF) of Singapore has recently announced that retirement assets held by its citizens in
the national defined contribution plan must be mandatorily annuitized so as to better
protect retirees against the possibility of outliving their wealth. At the same time, the
government has decided to enter the insurance market as a provider for these annuities.
This paper evaluates the money’s worth of privately-offered annuities prior to the

25

This chapter has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Risk and Insurance (John Wiley and
Sons). See Fong, J.HY., O.S. Mitchell, and B.SK. Koh, 2011, Longevity Risk Management in
Singapore’s National Pension System, Journal of Risk and Insurance, Forthcoming.
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reform, discusses the impact of the government mandate, and assesses how the entry of
the government as an annuity provider is shaping the nation’s insurance markets. Our
results are of interest for several reasons. First, the CPF is widely acknowledged as one
of the world’s largest – and arguably most successful – defined contribution schemes.
Accordingly it is valuable to see how this system is handling the challenges of a rapidly
aging population. Second, we seek to determine whether market failure – i.e. low valuefor-money annuities – prompted the government to enter the insurance market as an
annuity provider, and whether the new government-offered annuities will provide
greater value to retirees.
We show that competitively-priced life annuities were offered by private
insurers in Singapore prior to the reform, with money’s worth ratios in the 0.88-1.05
range for males – on par with those in many other countries. Moreover, adverse
selection costs were reasonable, on the order of 3.3 to 5.6 percentage points. The new
government-offered annuities are estimated to provide money’s worth ratios exceeding
unity, benefitting annuitants on average but also implying that the annuity mandate will
be expensive for the government if current pricing continues.
These findings are relevant to the current debate about how to best deploy
annuities to manage longevity risk, within the context of a defined contribution scheme.
On the positive side, mandating annuitization can reduce loads and adverse selection
and can help retirees better manage the risk of outliving their income, as detailed by
Emms and Haberman (2008) and Horneff et al. (2008). Yet on the negative side,
mandating can also pose challenges. For instance, making annuity purchase compulsory
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produces utility losses for less risk-averse retirees. 26 Also, if left to private annuity
providers, market distortions can arise: for instance, in the U.K. Murthi, Orszag and
Orszag (2000) describe falling annuity yields, high markups on annuities, and ‘misselling’ incidents, which they attributed to a captive yet privately-run insurance market.
By contrast, the Singaporean approach shows that a national government can both
mandate and provide a risk-pooling scheme. Yet there are also risks in government
provision, in that private insurers may be crowded out in the process. Indeed in
Singapore, all but one of the eight private insurers stopped selling CPF-compliant
annuities between 2007 and 2009. Whether this crowd-out effect is short-term or
permanent remains an open question and an important one to address in future research.

2.1 Background
Established in 1955, the Central Provident Fund is the mainstay of Singapore’s
old-age system. It is one of the world’s largest defined contribution schemes with about
3.23 million members; the program also faces a rapidly aging population due to one of
the world’s lowest fertility rates (1.29 per female) and longest life expectancies (80.6
years at birth).27 The government of Singapore has recently introduced the concept of a
national longevity insurance scheme to address the challenges of increasing life
expectancy given population aging (CPF 2009a). As of 2013, annuitization, rather than
the current phased withdrawal approach, will become the mandatory vehicle for a
portion of CPF retirement saving under the auspices of the regulatory public agency

26
27

See for example, Mitchell et al. (1999) and Blake, Cairns, and Dowd (2003).
Figures for 2007 year-end from the Singapore Department of Statistics (SDOS 2008a).
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known as the CPF Board. Under the CPF LIFE scheme, new annuity products began to
be offered in September of 2009.
Prior to this reform, the government had established the concept of a Minimum
Sum (MS) which required participants at age 55 to set aside for retirement a specific
dollar value of assets from their total CPF accumulations;28 excess accumulations could
be withdrawn as a lump-sum. 29 This Minimum Sum had to be preserved to age 65
(previously 62) before any drawdowns were permitted, and the default decumulation
option after that was a phased withdrawal scheme paying benefits over about 20 years
(or until the balance was exhausted).

This framework exposed participants to

significant longevity risk, since about half of all age-65 members would be expected to
outlive their assets (CPF 2008). Those having the full Minimum Sum amount in cash
could voluntarily buy a life annuity from private insurers, but this group was a small
fraction of the total. Among the active members who turned 55 in 2008, only about onethird had accumulated the required MS (CPF 2009b). And only one in six eligible to do
so actually elected to buy an annuity from private insurers under the MS Scheme,30
perhaps because the phased withdrawal payout of S$790 was higher compared to an
average monthly annuity payment of S$520.31 Another reason might be costs; indeed
28

The required Minimum Sum is set by the CPF and increases each year. It was S$80,000 in 2003,
S$99,600 in 2007 and it is expected to be about S$134,000 in 2013 (CPF 2008 and 2009b).
29
If a member’s total balance is higher than the Minimum Sum, any remaining balance can be withdrawn
as a lump sum. If the total balance is less than the Minimum Sum, the following withdrawal rules
currently apply to members who reach age 55 between 1/1/2010 and 6/30/2010: if the balance ≤ $5,000
one may withdraw everything; if $5,000 < total balance ≤ $16,667 one may withdraw $5,000 and set
aside the remainder in the Retirement Account; and if $16,667 < total balance ≤ $167,143 one may
withdraw 30% of the balance and set aside the remainder in the Retirement Account (CPF 2009c).
30
See Fong et al. (2010).
31
This applies to a member with the full Minimum Sum of $99,600 at age 55 (as of 2007) (CPF 2007).
Under phased withdrawal, he could draw down his balance plus interest via monthly payouts of $790 and
the flow would continue for 20 years at which point the balance is likely to be exhausted.

45

Prime Minister Lee suggested as much in stating that “frankly speaking, the returns
have not been very attractive, (and) the costs have been high.” (SPMO 2007).
In 2007, the Singapore Government convened a National Longevity Insurance
Committee (NLIC) to study the feasibility of the national longevity insurance scheme.
After extensive hearings and review, it concluded:
“The operation of the scheme will involve significant mortality and
investment risks over a very long time horizon….The committee notes the
difficulties that some annuity providers abroad had run into when
various risks were not properly managed. In some circumstances,
provider risked insolvency as they were unable to meet liabilities...
Members of the public have therefore expressed a preference of the CPF
Board to administer the scheme due to the favorable CPF interest
rates.…participants will need to have confidence in this national scheme
to provide for their retirement, the operator must engender public trust
and have strong administration capability.” (CPF 2008).
In other words, the Committee argued that the government should offer annuities due to
greater public trust and perhaps greater efficiency, and indeed it is possible that a
government-run pooling scheme could benefit from better annuity pricing through
economies of scale and lower administrative loads. Furthermore, if it could become the
primary provider, it could pool sufficient annuitants such that the average mortality risk
of the pool would decrease. Mitigating these advantages include concern about whether
the public sector would have sufficient in-house expertise and might crowd out
commercial insurers. In any event, in February 2008, the government mandated life
annuities and also required the CPF Board to operate a national longevity insurance
scheme that would “give Singaporeans confidence that the scheme will be properly
administered” (CPF 2008). Personnel from the Ministry of Manpower and the CPF
Board devoted almost two years to design the system, consulting industry professionals
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in the process. The launch of the pilot program in September 2009 was accompanied by
intensive public education through the media, road-shows, and pamphlets, and it
generated substantial interest: since launch, over 30,000 members committed about
S$1.5 billion to the CPF LIFE scheme (CPF 2010).
In what follows, we assess whether unattractive annuity yields and high costs
were, in fact, problematic in the Singaporean context and thus might rationalize
government provision.

2.2 Methodology
A large literature focuses on measuring the money’s worth of annuities in
Western countries. Consistent with that opus, we define the money’s worth ratio (MWR)
of a payout annuity as the ratio of the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of
annuity payments to the initial premium (Mitchell et al. 1999). Whereas a fairly priced
annuity with no loadings will have a MWR of unity, in the real world, privately-sold
annuities have MWRs of less than one due to administrative costs and adverse selection.
Adverse selection occurs in a voluntary market since those who elect to purchase a
payout annuity tend to live longer than those who do not; adverse selection raises prices
for all those who do purchase. Adverse selection costs are computed as the difference
between the MWRs using annuitant versus population survival tables (Mitchell et al.
1999). Many prior studies have used the MWR notion to measure value for money in a
range of annuity products including constant and rising payout products, joint-andsurvivor annuities, and annuities with guarantee periods (cf. Mitchell et al. 1999; Brown
et al. 2001; Finkelstein and Poterba 2002, 2004; Thorburn et al. 2005).
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The annuities offered under the Singaporean CPF scheme are somewhat
different from products on offer elsewhere, as they include a guaranteed amount if the
death of the insured occurs in a specified time frame. Specifically, when the insured
dies, the beneficiary receives the guaranteed amount of the single premium plus accrued
interest (if any) less total amount of annuity payouts already made (if positive).32 The
refund, which is a lump-sum payment to the beneficiary, provides an element of capital
protection.33 Accordingly, the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of a nominal
annuity with a guaranteed amount may be written as follows:
EPDV

∙

∙

∙

∙

t a·

a

, (1a)

max 0,
1.
In Equation (1a),

is the age at which the annuity is purchased, represents the number

of months beyond the annuity start date,

refers to the fixed monthly nominal annuity

payout for the individual purchasing the annuity at age ,
rate at month based on a riskless term structure, and
individual of age

is the nominal discount
is the probability that an

survives after months. To account for the guarantee amount and

the deferral period, we also define
is the death benefit at time

to be the deferred period (expressed in months),
1, and

32

∙

is the probability of an annuitant

Accrued interest is accumulated from age 55 when the premium is paid to the point where payouts start
(at age 62 in 2007). Not all annuities incorporate the accrued interest component in the guaranteed
amount on death. Accrued interest ranges from 0% to 2.5% per annum in 2007; see Table 2.1.
33
This is somewhat similar to the money-back annuities available in other countries. For example, valueprotected annuities that were introduced in the U.K. in 2006 feature partial money-back option where the
lump-sum death benefits are permitted up to age 75, and are taxed (Boardman 2006).
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age a surviving to months and then dying between month and month

1. The first

term in Equation (1a) captures the guarantee amount to the beneficiary if the insured
dies during the deferral period, while the second term reflects benefits paid to the
insured if he lives to the point when payouts start. Alternatively, the formula can be
more neatly presented per Equation (1b) where the first summation accounts for the
death benefit arising from the money-back guarantee, and the second summation
captures the annuity benefit over the lifetime of the individual:
∙

EPDV

∙

t a·

a

,

(1b)

To implement the EPDV valuation for Singapore, we use the newly released
population mortality tables from Singapore Statistics (SDOS 2008b) having a limiting
age of 100; we then cohortize the population tables (as cohort mortality tables are
unavailable) using period life tables. Thus having a year 2007 period life table, we
compute:
2007
where

2007

,

(2)

2007 is the annual mortality rate for age x in year 2007,

estimated annual mortality rate for age

in year 2007

2007

, and

estimated annual mortality improvements for an individual aged

is the

represents the
extrapolated from

mortality changes between 1990 and 2005. As in previous studies, mortality
improvement rates are projected from the abridged period population tables for
Singapore published by the World Health Organization (various years).
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Little is publicly known on actual annuitant mortality experience in Singapore.
Insurance industry practice and previous research including Fong (2002) has adopted
the UK annuitant mortality experience with adjustments for local conditions, similar to
what is done in Australia. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) in its capacity
as insurance regulator requires firms to employ the UK a(1990) Ultimate Tables rated
down five years for reserves and liability valuations pertaining to annuities sold (MAS
2008a).34 Accordingly, we use the a(1990) tables with a five-year setback to estimate
the annuitant experience for our valuation year, and then we cohortize the resulting
annuitant tables.35 We compute cumulative survival probabilities from the cohort tables
as follows:
1

where

,

(3)

is the cumulative probability of a person aged

is the probability of a person age

surviving for years, and

dying within the year. These cumulative

survival probabilities are sex-specific and calculated on a monthly basis to match the
frequency of the annuity payouts. In addition, we apply a uniform distribution of deaths
(UDD) assumption to reflect mortality patterns in Singapore. We justify using UDD for
fractional ages within a year due to the lack of variation in Singapore's weather (so
34

The Sixth Schedule of the Insurance Regulations 2004 stipulates that insurers may employ the rates in
the UK a(90) tables with a five-year setback to value their annuity liabilities. Previously, Insurance
Regulations 1992 required insurers to employ the a(1990) tables with a two-year setback. The a(1990)
tables are constructed based on UK annuitants’ mortality experience from 1967-70 with mortality
improvements projected to 1990. By applying the 5-year setback, we effectively age the tables to Year
2007 and then cohortize for the MWRs.
35
As a robustness check, we verify that our calculations yield a lower mortality for annuitant cohort than
the population cohort; for instance, a 65-year-old male in the general population has a mortality of
0.01028 compared to 0.00933 for an annuitant.
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death rates are unlikely to vary seasonally). 36 We match the limiting age of the
population group with that of the annuitant group by extrapolating population mortality
estimates to the common maximum age of 117 to properly capture the longevity tail risk
in the population group. 37 This improves comparability between the two groups by
ensuring that a person drawn randomly from the population also has some probability of
survival leading to annuity payouts even at the tail end, rather than being curtailed at
100 years of age.
Figure 2.1 compares the cumulative survival probabilities we derive for the
general Singaporean population and for annuitants. The Figure shows the probability
that a 55-year old man (or woman) will survive to various ages given mortality rates for
the population at large, as well as those for annuitants. Not surprisingly, the average 55year old annuitant has a higher survival probability at all ages, implying some adverse
selection costs to be discussed below.38
[Figure 2.1 here]
The EPDV calculation requires a term structure of interest rates; we judge the
Singaporean Treasury bond rates as most appropriate since the MSS annuities are
viewed as capital protected. Prices and yields of the Singapore Government Securities
36

Various actuarial assumptions could be used for fractional ages within a year, including a uniform
distribution of deaths, a constant force of mortality, or a hyperbolic pattern (Bowers et al. 1997). Prior
studies on MWR have not explicitly specified assumptions for fractional ages within a year (e.g. Doyle et
al. 2004). For a plot of our values of
∙
derived from the UDD assumption, see Appendix
Figure 2.1.
37
We use population period tables from Singapore Statistics. These tables had applied the Coale-Kisker
method to project mortality at higher ages, using a separation factor of 0.5 (SDOS 2008b). Given qx for
ages 85 -99, we back out the death rates (mx) and observe that the change in mx between each age interval
is constant at about 9.3%. Extrapolating this constant graduation rate, we then derive the qx for ages 100 117.
38
Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) attributed these mortality differences largely to socio-economic, or
passive, selection effects.
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Treasury bonds obtained from MAS (2008b) are used to compute the riskless spot rates
to proxy the yields on hypothetical zero coupon bonds. 39 To obtain the full term
structure, we then linearly interpolate between intervals where spot rates are unavailable,
for instance between the 7- and 10-year spot rates.40

2.3 Results: MWRs for Voluntary Private Annuities
Prior to the mandatory annuity reform, plan participants with sufficient cash
could voluntarily purchase a life annuity from 7-9 insurers participating in the market;
the firms included some international players with Singaporean offices (e.g. AIA,
Prudential, and HSBC Insurance), as well as several local insurers. 41 This program
promoted annuity purchase among CPF participants; Fong (2002) estimated that as at
2000, about 87 percent of all Singapore annuitants had purchased their policies through
this scheme. The annuity premium equaled the prevailing Minimum Sum for the year,
and insurers were free to determine participant payouts and guarantee amounts. In 2007,
for instance, in exchange for a lump-sum premium at age 55 of S$99,600, monthly
annuity payouts beginning at age 62 varied as outlined in Table 2.1. The nine annuities
on offer by eight commercial insurers were similar in that the standard deviation in
39

The first year rate is derived from the 1-year Treasury bill; thereafter, the 2, 5, 7, 10, 15 and 20-year
Treasury bond rates as of 2007 are used to estimate the riskless spot rates. Our annual spot rate ranges
from 1.4% to 3.44%. Since maximum duration available is only 20 years, we then extrapolate the last
spot rate into the future, yielding a nominal riskless term structure of interest rates on Singapore’s
Treasury bonds.
40
See Appendix Table 2.1 for a list of key inputs compared to those used in two earlier money’s worth
studies for annuities in Singapore.
41
As at Dec 2007, three insurers accounted for almost 80% of the total market share for individual
annuity policies, inclusive of annuity purchases using non-CPF pension saving (MAS 2007). In particular,
a home-grown co-operative, NTUC Income, has long been the market leader with 58% market share and
about 38,000 annuity policies in force as at end 2007. Great Eastern Life and UOB Life have
approximately 11% market share each, higher than that of AIA (8.5%) and Prudential (1.6%).
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payments was only about five percent. All annuities had fixed nominal payouts; two
also promised a non-guaranteed annual bonus payment depending on the insurer’s
performance. Level monthly payouts ranged from S$495-559 for males and S$441-514
for females; the guaranteed amount upon death was at least the premium S$99,600 and
several annuities paid interest of 0.5-2.5%.
[Table 2.1 here]
Using these annuity quotes in Equation (1) generates the desired MWRs
reported in Table 2.2. Here we see that, per premium dollar, the typical male annuitant
would have anticipated receiving an average of $0.947 and the female $0.955 in 2007.
It is also of interest that the NTUC Income co-operative offered the highest money’s
worth ratios of 1.047 (males) and 1.081 (females); these exceeded the private insurer
average by 10.5 and 13.1 percent, respectively. 42 We measure the cost of adverse
selection as the difference in the MWR using population versus annuitant tables. Our
values of 3.3–4.1 percentage points (or cents per $1 premium) for males and 4.2–5.6 for
females are comparable to the U.K. figure of 4.6 reported by Finkelstein and Poterba
(2002) but below the 6 and 10 percentage points found for Australia and U.S.
respectively (Doyle et al. 2004; Mitchell at al. 1999). In terms of proportion, we see
from the Table that adverse selection costs accounted for about 47% of the total
loadings, which is quite reasonable compared to other countries. For example, in the
U.S., Brown et al. (2001) found that roughly half of the cost of purchasing a voluntary
annuity could be attributed to adverse selection.

42

NTUC Income is a non-profit oriented co-operative for the Workers’ Union. This result is consistent
with NTUC Income’s mission to return the majority of profits to policyholders (NTUC Income 2009).
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[Table 2.2 here]
The reasonable adverse selection costs observed in the private annuity market in
Singapore may be partly attributed to the unique characteristics of the MS Scheme
annuities. For one thing, the premium guarantees contribute significantly to reducing
adverse selection; indeed in results not reported here in detail, removing the embedded
guarantee would increase adverse selection by 20-26 percent. Also important is the
deferral period on these annuities (between ages 55 and the benefit-claiming age).
Without this, adverse selection would have been higher by 9-13 percent. In any case,
the annuity marketplace prior to the most recent reform offered relatively competitively
priced products, by world standards, with reasonable adverse selection costs.

2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
As noted earlier, annuitant mortality rates for Singapore are derived from UK
annuitant tables, due to lack of annuitant experience in Singapore. To evaluate how
sensitive our results are to variations in mortality, we modify the tables to allow life
expectancy to vary by two years on either side of our base case annuitant estimates,
dated from the year of purchase. The mortality of a 57-year-old then represents a +2year adjustment and the mortality of a 53-year-old represents a -2-year adjustment.
Results in Table 2.3 (Panel A) show that lightening mortality by two years exacerbates
adverse selection, while the opposite holds when mortality is made heavier. In addition,
the adjustments make slightly more difference to the adverse selection results for males
than females. We also explore sensitivity to interest rate variations. The Singapore
government bonds were used to derive the riskless term structure. The spot rate on the
54

20-year bond (3.44%) was used as a proxy for the long-term interest rate for periods
beyond 20 years. Sensitivity testing using 50 and 100 basis points around the central
case shows that money’s worth values are sensitive to these changes, as Table 2.3
(Panel B) indicates. In any event, our estimates of adverse selection remain robust.
[Table 2.3 here]

2.5 Results: MWRs for Mandatory Annuities
Under the new CPF LIFE scheme introduced in 2009, participants may either
purchase a private annuity or select from a menu of government-offered annuity
products called the CPF LIFE plans. Initially the intention was to provide a dozen
different payout options outlined in 2008, but the menu was later pared back to four
plans in 2009 after public feedback suggested that too much choice was confusing. The
final four are known as CPF LIFE Basic, LIFE Balanced, LIFE Plus, and LIFE Income.
Table 2.4 presents illustrative payouts for the various LIFE plans as the government’s
proposals evolved, for an annuity premium of half the estimated Minimum Sum or
S$67,000 in 2013.43 For that premium, benefit payouts were initially set to be quite
generous: in six of the 12 original plans proposed in early 2008, monthly payouts would
have ranged from S$560-650 for males and S$540-590 for females. By September of
2009, when the final LIFE plans were launched, promised monthly payouts had been
adjusted downward to about S$524-636 for men and S$500-553 for women.
[Table 2.4 here]
43

By 2013, the prevailing Minimum Sum is expected to be about S$134,000 (S$99,600 in 2007). The
CPF estimated that of the approximately 35,000 active members in the 2103 cohort of members turning
age 55, about 60% will have at least S$67,000 in cash in their Retirement Accounts (CPF 2008).
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Table 2.4 also shows the ‘annuity component’ expressed as a percentage of the
annuity premium. That is, the CPF LIFE products split the premium paid into a term
and an annuity component. The first covers payouts from age 65 to the vesting age
which differs across the plans; any unused balance from the term component and
interest from it is fully refundable to one’s heirs. The annuity component finances
payouts from the vesting age to death with no funds passed on to the beneficiary. Thus
the four finalized LIFE plans provide a range of trade-offs, balancing providing for
oneself and leaving a bequest for one's beneficiaries. In practice, the transition from the
term to the annuity component is purely procedural and does not affect monthly benefits
to any CPF member in receipt, with the interest from the annuity component being nonrefundable to individual participants as it funds the CPF LIFE scheme. In other words,
interest forfeited represents participants’ opportunity cost of joining the LIFE plan. This
cost is factored into the money’s worth computations by means of a guaranteed amount
Gt that falls as the retiree ages. While the LIFE Plus and LIFE Income plans both feature
only an annuity component, the LIFE Plus product permits some bequest whereas LIFE
Income allows none. 44 A retiree who opts for the LIFE Income product received a
higher monthly payout while alive, making the product most appealing to unmarried or
childless individuals. By comparison, the LIFE Basic plan provides for the highest
bequest amount in exchange for the lowest monthly payouts by allocating most to the
term component. The LIFE Balanced plan provides an intermediate mix.
44

The bequest on the LIFE Plus plan is the unused portions of the annuity component (which in this case
is equal to the premium paid). Refund equals premium paid less annuity payouts already made. Members
who join CPF LIFE may not withdraw unless they have medical grounds of shortened life expectancy, or
if they are leaving Singapore and West Malaysia permanently with no intention of returning to either
country. Members are also not allowed to change their LIFE plans after joining the scheme (CPF 2009d).
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Since these annuities are being mandated, we generate money's worth values
using Singapore population mortality tables. Results in Table 2.4 show that the
government LIFE plans offer excellent value-for-money to annuitants. 45 For instance,
using the riskless term structure with a long-term rate assumption of 3.44 percent,
MWRs range from 1.24-1.31 for males and 1.26-1.34 for females. These values are far
above those provided by the privately-provided life annuities where it will be recalled
that mean MWRs were 0.947 for men and 0.955 for women (using annuitant mortality).
It might be thought that the interest rate environment in Singapore is unusually low, so
we recomputed the MWRs using a higher long-term rate of 4.44 percent (close to the
yield of the longest-term 10-year bond in 1998); under these circumstances, the MWRs
appear in brackets in the last four rows of Table 2.4. The higher interest rate assumption
still yields MWRs of 1.10-1.15 for males and 1.09-1.14 for females.
Looking at the patterns of benefit values, it is interesting to note that the LIFE
Income (sans bequest) and LIFE Plus (low bequest) plans provide higher MWRs than
do the other two plans, implying a small penalty if participants elect a plan that includes
bequests. Also it is apparent that as the design was fine-tuned over time, MWRs were
dialed down; perhaps policymakers realized that the early pricing was overly generous.
Yet even so, MWRs of the CPF LIFE payouts remain at or slightly above unity,
45

Based on communications with the CPF Board, we also assume interest rates are compounded and
credited annually to the Retirement Account (RA), but if the member dies in any month, any interest
earned up to that point in time is immediately credited and so refunded. Even when a member reached
vesting age, any unused balance in the RA continues to earn interest. If the member adds top-ups to the
RA, this also forms part of the principal and earns interest. On death, any unused balance in the RA is
refunded. For the original 12 plans, the extra 1% earned on the total MS is allocated pro-rata to the RA
and pooled interest based on the component balances for each month. However, for the final four plans,
the extra 1% earned on the total MS is allocated entirely to the RA. Finally, if the member dies after
vesting age, any unused balance of the annuity component (except for the LIFE Income plan), will be
refunded to his beneficiaries.
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compared to the lower values of private insurer annuities that had been available. The
government’s higher payout results in part from lower administrative loads compared to
those levied by private insurers, and in part from less adverse selection due to the
compulsory annuitization (though above we had indicated this was relatively small in
Singapore).46 A long-term rate assumption set closer to historical norms also generates
MWR values closer to one.
As the administrator, the CPF Board determines the premium and payouts with
advice from independent actuarial consultants, so the new design may intentionally
include a small subsidy to CPF members so as to jump-start the new scheme. Indeed the
government has offered a sign-on bonus (called the L-bonus) for the first five cohorts of
members joining CPF LIFE for whom the scheme is voluntary.47 Also our computations
assume constant nominal payouts though in fact, payouts may vary in the future,
depending on the future evolution of interest rates and mortality. Though the CPF
Board can adjust payouts periodically to reflect actual mortality experience and
investment return, it is noteworthy that it has assured members that adjustments will
usually be small so that nominal payouts are anticipated to remain relatively stable over
time (CPF 2009d).48
46

Similarly, in the U.S. context, Abel (1986) showed that because the U.S. Social Security system is
compulsory, it is immune to adverse selection and a fully funded system can offer a rate of return equal to
the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality.
47
The L-Bonus is targeted at lower and middle-income CPF members age 46-50 in 2008. It is given to
these members when they enroll in the CPF LIFE scheme at age 55. In fact, the LIFE Plus plan, which
provides a higher monthly payout and leaves less bequest for beneficiaries has proven most popular in the
pilot launch (CPF 2010); over half of the members selected it. In addition, more than S$60 million of
LIFE Bonus (L-Bonus) has been given to about 70% of the members for joining the scheme.
48
Responding to members seeking to join CPF LIFE ahead of the official launch date of 2013, the CPF
Board began offering LIFE plans in September of 2009 to members born in 1954 or before. Inasmuch as
annuitization is not yet mandatory, this first phase of CPF LIFE operates on a voluntary opt-in basis
(from 2013, annuitization will be mandatory). Younger members will be auto-included in the LIFE
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
A topic of substantial interest to international policymakers is whether a national
annuitization scheme should be administered by the private or the public sector. 49
Having a single provider can reduce costs through economies of scale, and a
government-run scheme may be perceived to be safer by retirees than private insurers
which may face bankruptcy (Babbel and Merrill 2007). In the Singaporean case, the
Civil Service is regarded as one of the most efficient bureaucracies in the world with a
high standard of discipline and accountability (Heritage.org 2010) and the fact that the
CPF has traditionally paid interest on annuities at a rate pegged to the 10-year
Singapore Treasury bond plus 1 percent with a 2.5 percent floor implies that citizens
tend to view such returns as risk-free (given the AAA rating of government bonds). It is
therefore interesting that the annuities offered by Singapore’s CPF LIFE scheme appear
to be priced very favorably to the consumer compared to other developed countries (see
Table 2.5). Our preliminary evidence therefore could indicate that Singapore has been
able to pass cost savings from scale economies and onto annuitants.
[Table 2.5 here]
It is also worth noting that, while CPF members may still buy life annuities from
a private insurer, few firms appear to be able to compete. That is, there were nine

Balanced plan if they have at least $40,000 cash savings in their Retirement Account as of age 55.
Members with less than S$40,000 can opt-in if they wish (CPF 2009d). The cut-off for auto-inclusion
into CPF LIFE was selected to balance the level of monthly income and the percentage of active CPF
members automatically included. At S$40,000, it is estimated that some 70% of active members will be
automatically included from the first cohort (i.e. those who turn age 55 in 2013; CPF 2009f).
49
Here we do not take up the question of whether mandatory annuitization is welfare enhancing, a topic
explored in some detail by Brown (2003).
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private insurance companies offering annuities in 2007, but only one remained by late
2009. The withdrawal of insurers from the annuity market may be of concern to
policymakers if product innovation and pricing pressure requires competition among
product providers in the industry. In addition, by marketing both life insurance and life
annuities, insurers would be expected to benefit from some natural hedging across the
two products. It is possible that private annuity providers could refocus their business
outside the CPF scheme for retirees seeking to annuitize non-pension wealth. Also since
the amount that CPF members can annuitize via the CPF LIFE product is capped at the
stipulated Minimum Sum amount, wealthy individuals could still turn to commercial
annuities. Moreover, the life annuities currently offered by the government are nominal
and not inflation-adjusted and hence retirees may find some benefit from inflationlinked payouts, not currently available under the CPF LIFE system.
These findings are also of interest in nations where governments are
increasingly concerned about annuitization in defined contribution plans. For instance,
in the U.S. 401(k) pension marketplace, few retirees convert their assets into insured
payout products and instead take their money as a lump sum (Brown et al. 2001). In
response, to protect against longevity risk, some have proposed making annuitization
the default payout mechanism from a defined contribution pension. For instance, Gale
et al. (2008) recommend that 401(k) assets be automatically directed into a “trial”
payout product unless the retiree affirmatively elects not to participate. After 24
monthly payments from the automatic payout plan, the retiree could either do nothing
and be defaulted into a permanent income distribution plan, or elect an alternative
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distribution option. By making it easier for retirees to purchase lifetime income plans, it
is anticipated that these would become a better value for the average consumer.
We conclude that Singapore’s recent move to mandate annuities under the
national defined contribution pension system represents a logical step toward national
longevity risk management. By establishing the government as an annuity provider, the
CPF Board may have taken advantage of scale economies and reduced the pricing
impact of adverse selection, given that the latter was found to be quite a substantial
proportion of total loadings. Furthermore, the aggressive annuity pricing is creating
public buy-in for the new mandate, while indirectly working to compensate less riskaverse individuals in terms of foregone equity premium. One offset may be that private
insurers have been crowded out, in part because the CPF-designed product pays
participants more than what commercial insurance companies had offered. Without
competition, it is unclear whether annuity pricing will continue to be attractive and
whether product innovation will continue in Singapore. Related questions, as yet
unsettled, have to do with whether favoring annuity payments over payments to
survivors is politically sustainable, and how long the government will be able to
continue subsidizing payouts.
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Table 2.1: Monthly Nominal Payouts for Life Annuities purchased at the
Minimum Sum of S$99,600 (2007; S$ per month; entry age of 55)
Monthly payout
Company & Product

Guaranteed amount on
death (less annuity
payments)

Male
(S$)

Female
(S$)

505.47
530.87

454.47
513.94

Premium.
Premium.

559.00

507.00

Great Eastern Life (GE Life I)

535.35

484.30

Great Eastern Life (GE Life II)
[Note: This product includes
long term care benefit.]
Overseas Assurance
Corporation (OAC)

494.26

440.73

535.35

494.26

Prudential Assurance
Sub-average

518.44
525.53

449.87
477.80

Premium + accrued interest
compounded at 1% p.a. to
commencement date of
annuity.
Premium + interest
accumulated at 0.75% p.a. to
age 62.
Premium + interest
accumulated at 0.5% p.a. to
age 62.
Premium + interest
accumulated at 0.75% p.a. to
age 62.
Premium.

474.00
(541.58)

458.00
(525.58)

523.50
(591.08)

490.25
(557.83)

Sub-average

498.75

474.13

Overall Average

519.58

476.98

Non-participating Annuities
Asia Life Assurance
American International
Assurance (AIA)
Aviva

Participating Annuities
HSBC Insurance
NTUC Income Co-op

Premium + interest
accumulated at 2% p.a. to age
62.
Premium + interest
accumulated at 2.5% p.a. and
bonuses to age 62.

Source: Authors’ computations from CPF (2007).
Notes: p.a. denotes per annum. Monthly payouts for a nominal deferred annuity purchased at age 55 with
payments starting at age 62. The single premium is the Minimum Sum of S$99,600 for members age 55
(7/07-6/08). The MS Scheme currently guarantees named beneficiaries a given amount in the event of
annuitant’s death equal to the (positive) difference between the guaranteed amount and annuity payments
made. Previously (in 2000) most MS annuities were guaranteed for a certain period so if death occurred
during the guaranteed period, remaining annuity payments would be converted into a lump sum paid to
beneficiaries. Bonus rates depend on company performance; NTUC Income’s annual bonus rates were 13.5% historically (NTUC 2009) and a 2% bonus is used in NTUC Income benefit illustrations. Original
payouts without bonus expressed without brackets; figures in brackets incorporate bonus component
assuming an annual projected bonus rate of 2%.
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Table 2.2: Money’s Worth Ratios and Adverse Selection Costs for Nominal Life
Annuities Offered by Private Insurers under the CPF Plan (2007)
Male
Company &
Product

Pop.
MWR

Non-participating Annuity
Asia Life Assurance
0.861
AIA
0.907
Aviva
0.943
GE Life I
0.910
GE Life II
0.846
OAC
0.907
Prudential Assurance
0.879
Participating Annuity
HSBC Insurance
0.933
NTUC Income Co-op
1.006
Mean

0.910

Female

Ann.
MWR

Adverse
Selection

Pop.
MWR

Ann.
MWR

Adverse
Selection

0.896
0.943
0.982
0.947
0.879
0.945
0.915

3.47
3.62
3.98
3.71
3.34
3.74
3.62

0.840
0.943
0.930
0.893
0.818
0.908
0.833

0.885
0.995
0.981
0.941
0.860
0.957
0.876

4.44
5.20
5.14
4.78
4.22
4.98
4.37

0.969
1.047

3.59
4.09

0.969
1.024

1.021
1.081

5.20
5.61

0.947

3.69

0.906

0.955

4.88

Source: Author’s computations, see text.
Notes: “Pop.” refers to the general population group and “Ann.” refers to the annuitant group. Money’s
worth ratios are in decimals and adverse selection costs are in percentage points. Computations pertain to
a CPF participant who purchases the MS Scheme annuity at entry age 55 for a premium of S$99,600 and
starts receiving payouts at age 62. The term structure of interest rate uses derived spot rates for 1, 2, 5, 7,
10 and 20-year bonds with linear interpolation between years.
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Table 2.3: Robustness Analysis for Nominal Life Annuities Offered by Private
Insurers under the CPF Plan (2007)
A. Sensitivity to Alternative Mortality Assumptions
Male
Mortality rates

Ann.

2 years lighter
Base case
2 years heavier

0.962
0.939
0.917

Female

Pop.

AS

Ann.

0.901

6.05
3.80
1.57

0.972
0.951
0.929

Pop.

AS

0.901

7.11
5.03
2.86

Source: Authors’ computations.

B. Sensitivity to Alternative Long-Term Interest Rate Assumptions (±0.5% and ±1%)
Long-term
interest rate
2.44%
2.94%
3.44% (base)
3.94%
4.44%

Male

Female

Ann.

Pop.

AS

Ann.

Pop.

AS

1.067
0.998
0.939
0.889
0.846

1.010
0.951
0.901
0.858
0.821

5.70
4.66
3.80
3.10
2.51

1.110
1.024
0.951
0.889
0.837

1.033
0.961
0.901
0.849
0.804

7.69
6.22
5.03
4.07
3.28

Source: Authors’ computations.
Notes: “Pop.” refers to the general population group and “Ann.” refers to the annuitant group. This
analysis uses the average annuity payouts (with bonus) of the private annuities given in Table 2.1. For the
base case of 3.44%, the MWR values of this pseudo average-payout annuity are slightly lower than the
mean of the individual MWR values reported in Table 2.2 because the individual computations
incorporate interest accrued during the deferral period where applicable.
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Table 2.4: Illustrative Payouts and Money’s Worth Ratios of CPF LIFE Plans
(annuity premium of S$67,000; various dates)
Male

Female
MWR

Monthly
payout (S$)

Annuity
component

MWR

Proposed LIFE plans (as at February ’08):
Refund 90
560
6%

1.306

540

8%

1.350

Refund 85

590

13%

1.315

560

16%

1.361

Refund 80

610

24%

1.331

570

28%

1.371

Refund 75

630

41%

1.341

580

45%

1.374

Refund 70

640

66%

1.323

590

68%

1.370

Refund 65

650

100%

1.284

590

100%

1.311

6%*

1.264

496

8%*

1.308

24%*

1.313

515

28%*

1.355

100%

1.308

531

100%

1.332

100%

1.287

549

100%

1.313

LIFE plans

Monthly
payout (S$)

LIFE plans (as at June ‘09):
LIFE Basic
519
LIFE
556
Balanced
LIFE Plus
590
LIFE Income

632

Annuity
component

LIFE plans (as at September ‘09):
LIFE Basic

524

8.6%

1.240
[1.099]

500

13%

1.255
[1.088]

LIFE
Balanced

561

30%

1.252
[1.110]

520

35.5%

1.270
[1.098]

LIFE Plus

594

100%

1.315
[1.149]

535

100%

1.340
[1.142]

LIFE Income

636

100%

1.294
[1.119]

553

100%

1.322
[1.118]

Source: Authors’ computations; see text. Payout data obtained from CPF website (CPF 2008 and CPF 2009e).
Notes: The default plan offered at each point in time is bolded. Computations pertain to a CPF participant who joins
the LIFE plan at age 55 for a premium of S$67,000, and starts receiving payouts at age 65. In particular, the
parameter inputs generating this set of illustrative payouts in the CPF web calculator assume the Singaporean worker
was born June 1958 (so he is age 55 in 2013); AV=“More than S$11,000”; AI=“More than S$54,000”. The premium
paid is split into a term component and an annuity component. The term component funds payouts from age 65 to the
vesting age; vesting age differs across plans. The annuity component, expressed as a percentage of the annuity
premium, funds payouts from the vesting age to death. The reported payouts are indicative only; actual payout will
depend on actual CPF interest rates and mortality experience. CPF interest is computed monthly, reviewed quarterly
and, compounded and credited annually. Figures marked with (*) are estimated. Money’s worth ratios are computed
using the riskless term structure of interest rate with long-term interest rate assumption of 3.44% and assume constant
payouts over the participant’s lifetime. The assumed CPF interest rate is 4% with the statutory additional 1% paid on
the first S$60,000. The guaranteed amount refunded to the beneficiary upon the annuitant’s death is the unused
amounts left in the annuitant’s CPF retirement account (term component plus any interest earned) and the unused
amount of the annuity component (if refundable). MWR in brackets [ ] are based on an alternative long-term interest
rate assumption of 4.44%.
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Table 2.5: International Comparison of Money’s Worth Ratios

Country

US
US
UK a
Singapore
Singapore
Australia
Singapore b

Study

Friedman and
Warshawsky (1988)
Mitchell et al.
(1999)
Finkelstein and
Poterba (2002)
Fong (2002)
Doyle et al. (2004)
Doyle et al. (2004)
This study

Valuation
Date

MWR (65-year old
male; annuitant
mortality)

Cost of Adverse
Selection as %
of Total
Loading

1983

0.868

35.0%

1995

0.916

54.3%

1998
1998
2000
2000
2000
2007
2008 - 2009

0.988
0.962
0.933
0.947
0.939
0.947
1.10 - 1.15

91.1%
62.0%
13.0%
4.7%
49.7%
41.1%
-

Source: Authors.
Notes: All the MWR values reported for Singapore are based on a 55-year old male instead of a 65-year
old male. Total loading is defined as one minus money's worth of annuity for an individual from the
general population.
a
Results are reported in separate rows for the U.K. voluntary, and compulsory, annuity markets
respectively. Data in both markets are drawn from annuities offered by commercial insurers.
b
Results are reported in separate rows for annuities offered by commercial insurers, and new annuities
offered by the CPF Board, respectively. MWR values for the latter are based on September 2009 LIFE
plan payouts and a long-term interest rate assumption of 4.44%.
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Appendix Table 2.1: Assumptions used in Money’s Worth Computations for Life
Annuities under the CPF MS Scheme
This Table summarizes the data and results for various studies that assessed the
money’s worth of life annuities offered by private insurers under the CPF Minimum
Sum scheme. The three main inputs used in the money’s worth computation are annuity
quotes, annuitant and population mortality rates, and interest rates.
Fong (2002)

Doyle, Mitchell, and
Piggott (2004)

This study

Valuation Date
Sample chosen

2000
Subset of 8 nonparticipating annuities
& 1 participating
annuity.

2000
Subset of 5 nonparticipating annuities
with a 15-yr guarantee
period or similar.

2007
All MSS annuities:
7 non-participating & 2
participating annuities.

Model

MWR model with 15year certain.

MWR model with 15year certain.

MWR model for annuities
with guaranteed amount.
See Equation (1) in text.

a(90) with 2-year
setback; limiting age
used is 109.
Derived from 1960
and 1990 Ordinary
Male and Female
Lives Tables
(Singstat). Limiting
age of 99.

a(90) with 2-year
setback; limiting age
used is 109.
Abridged life tables for
Singapore (World Health
Organization). Limiting
age of 100.

a(90) with 5-year setback;
limiting age used is 117.

Flat interest rate
(proxy by the 10-year
Government bond
yield of 4.6%).

Term structure (yield
curve with long-term
rate assumption of
4.76%).

Term structure (yield
curve with long-term rate
assumption of 3.44%).

Mortality
Assumptions
Annuitant
Population

Interest Rate
Assumption
MWR results for
55-year-old Male
Annuitant
Population
Adverse
selection

2007 complete life tables
for Singapore resident
population (Singstat), plus
extrapolate from age 100
to limiting age of 117.

0.997
0.986

0.947
0.945

0.947
0.910

1.10

0.26

3.69

Source: Authors’ computations; see text.
Notes: A total of 13 MSS life annuities were offered in July 2000 of which 9 were flat-rate annuities, 2 were
participating annuities, and 2 were increasing annuities. The increasing annuities offered by AIA were dropped after
that year (Source: Personal communication from CPF Board). The a(90) table refers to the UK a(1990) period life
table for annuitants. It is based on UK annuitants’ experience from 1967-70, with mortality improvements projected
to 1990. Because of lack of annuitant experience in Singapore, previous studies used the a(90) and with a two-year
setback to account for lower mortality among annuitants. A two-year setback means that a 65-year-old is treated as
having the same mortality rate as a 63-year-old has in the initial table. Money’s worth ratios are in decimals and
adverse selection costs are in percentage points.
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Appendix Figure 2.1: Density Function of the Age-at Death random variable
This Figure plots
∙
for a random male drawn from the population who
purchases an annuity at age 55 in 2007. It shows the probability of death between month
and month
1 (conditional on living to month ). The function increases from age
55 to about age 95 where the rise in
outweighs the decline in
. In the
advanced ages, the opposite occurs and the probabilities fall. The jags in the plot
indicate that within each year, the probabilities are level consistent with the UDD
assumption. Because the limiting age is set at 117, any remaining probability mass is
assigned to the tail resulting in heaping at that outside age.
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CHAPTER 3
Beyond Age and Sex: Enhancing Annuity Pricing

How annuities are priced is of central concern to retirement decision-planning
for individuals, and also for defined contribution plans. Annuities offer valuable
longevity insurance against outliving one’s assets by providing a periodic income for
life in exchange for an upfront premium. But currently in U.S. and Canada, prices of
standard retail annuities do not reflect buyers’ personal characteristics other than age
and sex. This lack of information in prices generates two concerns. Firstly, because
insurers do not account for individual economic or health status, people who anticipate
living longer can self-select into annuities. Empirical studies have shown that adverse
selection exists in annuity markets (Mitchell et al. 1999; Finkelstein and Poterba 2002).
Secondly, it may lead to consumer perception that standard annuities are only priced for
those in very good health (Stewart 2007; Brown and McDaid 2003). Negative consumer
perception may frustrate policymakers’ efforts to expand the use of these lifetime
income instruments in employer-sponsored or government-run defined contribution
plans around the world.
The notion of using more risk-classes to price standard retail annuities has
gained support in recent years, largely motivated by an interest in growing the life
annuity market. In an OECD study, Stewart (2007) suggests that annuity providers
should be permitted to put people into different risk categories to allow for more pricing
flexibility, reduce adverse selection, and increase consumers’ trust in the pricing of
70

annuity products. In fact, some major U.K. insurers have already begun using more
personal characteristics such as client postcodes, marital status, and tobacco use, to
price their standard payout annuities (Banking Times 2008). Nonetheless, these insurers
are still struggling to define suitable pricing factors and work out the specifics (e.g. how
to classify individuals who have two addresses). Given the precedence of risk-class
pricing in life insurance and auto insurance, there is strong reason to believe that using
more indicators of life expectancy, other than just sex and age, might be a natural
evolution for retail annuity pricing.
A large literature focuses on measuring the money’s worth of annuities and
reports, in a voluntary purchase environment, that annuitants obtain higher money’s
worth from annuity purchase than would the population if all were to purchase.50 This
difference is quantified as the adverse selection cost. For example, Mitchell et al. (1999)
estimates adverse selection cost to be about 54% of total loadings in the U.S. annuity
market. In smaller annuity markets such as Singapore and Australia, estimates are also
about 40 to 50% (Fong et al. 2011; Doyle et al. 2004). Researchers have also shown that
the extent of adverse selection observed in actual annuity markets depends on market
type and product line. In particular, adverse selection is lower in compulsory markets as
compared to voluntary ones, and also for annuities with period-certain guarantees as
compared to those without guarantees (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002).

51

Since

information asymmetry arises because annuity buyers have “private” information about
50

See for example, Mitchell et al. (1999) and Finkelstein and Poterba (2002).
In 1998, the U.K. compulsory annuity market was much larger than the voluntary market; there is less
scope for adverse selection in the former because participants in defined contribution occupational, or
personal, pension plans must annuitize their resources (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002). Less adverse
selection is observed for annuities with longer period-certain guarantees primarily because of shorterlived individuals self-select into annuities with longer guarantee periods.
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their mortality, the extent of adverse selection is likely to depend on pricing structures
as well. It would seem that incorporating more personal characteristics in annuity
pricing can help reduce adverse selection. Yet investigations of this kind are
challenging for a number of reasons, including the need to construct plausible
alternative pricing schemes, and having to model selection effects as pricing structures
evolve.
The primary contribution of this paper is to use longitudinal micro data from the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to develop alternative pricing structures and
examine their impact on annuitization values accruing to different demographic groups.
Using a proportional hazards framework, I show that several readily-measurable risk
factors can significantly increase explained variability in mortality outcomes. Adding
the ten best-ranked factors to age and sex increases explained variation from 6.7% to
29.7%. Assuming one or more of these pricing factors are adopted, I then simulate
annuity prices for a variety of pricing schemes and compute the annuitization value
accruing to a given demographic group under each scheme. Both the financial value and
utility value of longevity insurance are assessed.
The impact of risk-class pricing on adverse selection is not straightforward. The
need to collect more information may result in insurers imposing higher administrative
fees. Even if a rating class is justified, insurers may not have the flexibility to introduce
large disparity in prices in actual markets. Annuity purchase decisions are also
influenced by many factors other than just the financial return from annuities. It is,
however, widely believed that more detailed pricing reduces information asymmetries
between the insurer and the insured and thus will reduce adverse selection. My paper
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contributes to this discussion by highlighting two effects that may occur when more
pricing factors are implemented: (1) shorter-lived groups will be sufficiently induced to
buy annuities and enter the market, and (2) longer-lived groups will still be incentivized
to stay in the annuity market. Overall, this will allow annuity markets to grow causing
the extent of adverse selection to fall.52
Compared to prior population-based studies on mortality, this paper is
distinguished by its effort to understand how several less conventionally-used variables
relate to retirement mortality. For instance, birth region is a truly exogenous
demographic variable but it is seldom used in empirical studies. Recently, Sloan et al.
(2010) find that being foreign-born is associated with lower mortality hazards. 53
Cognition is another interesting variable to examine in relation to older adults. For
example, Mehta et al. (2003) find cognitive function to be independently associated
with mortality among elderly adults above age 70 in the Asset and Health Dynamics
Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) study. This study is therefore informative regarding
the potential for these less conventional variables to serve as suitable pricing factors for
annuities.
Section 1 outlines some possible impediments to risk-class pricing, and
highlights recent efforts by commercial insurers to incorporate more personal

52

Point (2) is necessary because the co-existence of longer-lived and shorter-lived groups is what
distinguishes the standard annuity market (which is the focus of this paper) from an impaired annuity
market where detailed annuity underwriting is already in place. Impaired annuities are discussed later in
Section 1.1.
53
Several studies controlled for current residence instead, which is possibly endogenous to current
mortality. For example, Dupre et al. (2009) controlled for whether a respondent lives in the South. Sloan
et al. (2010) included dummies for whether a subject lives on a farm, and whether he is foreign-born.
Glymour et al. (2008) study the risk of first stroke among the HRS participants and specifically
incorporated an indicator for Southern birth-state (also known as the stroke belt).
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characteristics in annuity pricing. Section 2 describes the data and methodology.
Section 3 presents results from the proportional hazards regressions, and demonstrates
how risk-classification sharpens age-at-death predictions. Section 4 reports simulated
annuity premiums and assesses the financial value of annuities accruing to various
demographic groups under different pricing schemes. Section 5 examines the value of
annuities on a utility-adjusted basis in an environment of mortality heterogeneity.
Section 6 concludes.

3.1 Background
Pricing Structure of Annuities
The extent of underwriting varies across different types of annuities.54 At one
end of the spectrum are pension annuities and the U.S. Social Security pension system.
Job-based pension annuities are priced based on age (Brown 2002; US Supreme Court
1988). 55 Similarly, benefit payouts under the U.S. Social Security program are also
purely based on the age of annuitization. 56 Any differences along gender, racial, or
education lines are disregarded. In contrast, the retail annuity providers are permitted to
use gender-specific pricing. In U.S. and Canada, standard retail annuities are priced

54

Life insurance companies collect information about individuals before deciding at what price to sell
insurance to them. Applicants for insurance are individually interviewed (often by means of a written
questionnaire), and sometimes examined by a medical practitioner. This process is called “underwriting”.
55
In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), it is ruled that section 703(a)(1) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 barred requiring women to contribute more than men to pensions to receive the same
benefits. Later, a landmark Supreme Court decision in Florida v. Long similarly ruled that only unisex
mortality lifetables may be employed in the pricing of pension annuities (US Supreme Court 1988).
56
Social Security refers to the federal Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program,
which is a comprehensive federal benefits program developed in 1935. The Social Security is a pay-asyou-go defined benefit pension system funded through dedicated payroll taxes, and benefit payments are
made monthly to eligible individuals.
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based on age, sex, and the amount of money annuitized (Brown and McDaid 2003).
Females typically pay a higher premium than males under this pricing structure because
they are expected to live longer. In addition, Stewart (2007) reports that differential
pricing policy between races is allowed in the European Union.
At the other end of spectrum are so-called impaired or enhanced annuities.
Impaired annuities were introduced in the U.K. around 1995 and since then, this market
segment has grown in size and importance.57 Impaired annuities are sold to retirees with
profiles of high mortality (e.g. those in poor health) or those in nursing home care. It is
estimated that as many as 40 percent of U.K. annuity purchasers can qualify for
impaired annuities (The Investors Chronicle 2008). Underwriting for impaired annuities
is via a health questionnaire (mild medical conditions), and a medical report (for more
severe medical conditions such as heart attack, or cancer). Individuals who qualify for
such annuities enjoy lower premiums. In U.S. and Canada, impaired life annuities are
available but the market is small (Rusconi 2008; Brown and McDaid 2003). Such
annuities are only offered to individuals who can prove that they are in substandard
health via a medical certificate.
The focus of this paper is the pricing of standard annuities. Although impaired
annuities represent a growing niche in the annuity markets, they are limited to people
who are of substandard health and thus of less relevance to say, an average retiree of
average health who wishes to annuitize. The current pricing structure of standard retail
57

Impaired annuities were introduced in the U.K. around 1995 by a company called Stalwart, which was
later acquired by GE Capital (Bestwire 2010). Impaired annuity sales in the U.K. totaled £1.26 billion
(€1.51 billion) in the first six months of 2010. The full-year sales figure for 2009 was £1.78 billion, up
from £419.6 million in 2001. Companies currently active in this market segment include Aviva, Canada
Life, and Legal & General.
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annuities leaves much room for pause. This is because there are no obvious regulatory
barriers to risk-classification (aside from using sensitive factors like race), and the
insurance industry has a ready technology given their experience in the life insurance
business.
One possible impediment may be costs. According to a Deloitte 2008
benchmarking study of 15 U.S. life insurers, an insurer typically spends approximately
one month and several hundred dollars underwriting each applicant (Batty et al. 2010).
While a few hundred dollars is not necessarily cost-prohibitive for life insurance
products, it may be so for annuities. This is because annuities are relatively low-margin
financial products, and insurers already view them as not very profitable relative to
other product lines (Orth 2008). The underlying reason is due to very thin annuity
markets. Existing research shows that the voluntary markets for individual immediate
annuities in U.S., Australia, France, Germany, Italy and Japan are small (MacKenzie
2006; Brown 2001; Knox 2000).58 In addition, underwriting can be costly in terms of
buyer fraud. Brown and McDaid (2003) provide the analogy of an applicant who
smokes cigarettes for a period of time to get better annuity rates. Likewise, an applicant
may exaggerate her health problems to qualify for lower premiums.
A second reason pertains to the lack of annuitant mortality data. To justify
placing applicants into different pricing categories, there must be some actuarial basis
indicating how mortality differs among those groups. Because the insured population is
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Several reasons have been suggested to explain the lack of demand for annuities (or the so-called
annuity puzzle). Among the explanations are the role of adverse selection and administrative load factors
(Mitchell et al. 1999; Finkelstein and Poterba 2002), bequest motives (Abel and Warshawsky 1988), the
ability of risk-pooling within families (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981), and precautionary savings.
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not the same as the noninsured population, insurance companies typically collect
mortality experience of their applicants over a long period of time to facilitate such
analysis. A case in point is the smoker/nonsmoker rating class used in the life insurance
markets. In the 1960s, U.S. life insurance companies still charged the same rates to
smokers and nonsmokers (SOA, 1983), and it was only after two decades that sufficient
mortality experience emerged allowing actuaries to construct smoker/nonsmoker
mortality tables. These developments in turn led to cigarette smoking being adopted as a
rating class in life insurance policies.59 Similarly, substantial information on annuitants
needs to be collected before mortality differentials amongst risk-groups with different
demographic characteristics can be analyzed. Thus far, this has been an uphill task
because of the very thin annuity markets. Stewart (2007) reports that a surprisingly
large number of developed countries still lack the demographic data necessary to
construct accurate mortality projections for annuitants, and use lifetables from other
countries with richer annuitant experience such as U.K. and U.S.60
Regulatory restrictions may also play a role. For instance, sex has long been
employed as a rating class in life insurance whereby women pay lower premiums than
men because statistics show that women live longer. Yet in March 2011, the European
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Smoker/nonsmoker rates for life insurance policies are also successfully introduced with new
underwriting assistance such as blood tests (Brown and McDaid 2003).
60
Stewart (2007) also suggests that segmented mortality data on annuitants can be collected by
governments, or alternatively, by a cooperative arrangement among insurers willing to cost-share.
Currently, U.S. insurers typically use the RP-2000 annuitant lifetable as a reference (McCarthy and
Mitchell 2010). The RP-2000 annuitant life table is provided by the Society of Actuaries, and constructed
based on actual annuitant experience from plan years 1990 through 1994. In U.K., pensioner and
annuitant lifetables are available from the Continuous Mortality Investigation committee, and are
prepared based on actual annuitant experience collected from U.K. insurance companies. Annuitant
lifetables are distinct from actuarial tables used in valuing life insurance policies (e.g. the 2001 Valuation
Basic Table).
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Court of Justice ruled that the widespread practice of charging men and women
different rates for insurance is illegal and has set out to overhaul the pricing of
insurance policies across Europe by end 2012 (WSJ.com 2011). The U.S. prohibits
using sex in job-based pension annuities although it is allowed as a rating class for retail
annuities.
Movement towards Risk-based Pricing
The notion of using more risk-classes to price standard retail annuities is largely
motivated by an interest in growing the life annuity market. In an OECD study, Stewart
(2007) suggests that insurers should be permitted to risk-categorize annuitants to allow
for more pricing flexibility and to increase consumers’ trust in the pricing of annuity
products. Similarly, Brown and McDaid (2003) stress that workers will ideally want to
annuitize at fair-market rates that reflect their personal mortality profiles. Evidence
from other insurance markets suggests that effective underwriting can also alleviate
adverse selection problems. For instance in life insurance, Cawley and Philipson (1999)
present convincing evidence that life insurers may be better at identifying mortality risk
than individuals themselves. Similarly, McCarthy and Mitchell (2010) find that U.S.
and U.K. insurers’ screening of poorer risks in life insurance reduces asymmetric
information held by policyholders. In auto insurance, Chiappori and Salanie (2000)
conclude that “…the information at the [auto insurers] company's disposal is extremely
rich and that, in most cases, the asymmetry, if any, is in favor of the company.”
In the U.K., commercial insurers have begun using risk-based pricing for
standard annuities. In 2008, Norwich Union – an insurer with about 10 percent market
share – started using client postcodes, marital status, and tobacco use, to price its
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annuities (Banking Times 2008). Other major insurers like Prudential, and Legal &
General, have also justified using postal codes on the premise that those who reside in
more affluent areas tend to be longer-lived. In fact, U.K. market players observe that the
differentiation between impaired annuities and standard (non-impaired) annuities have
started to blur (Bestwire 2010). These developments represent a positive step towards
annuity risk-class pricing. Going forward, there is strong reason to believe that the
movement towards risk-class pricing for standard annuities may be sustained and
eventually extend to the rest of the world.
Nonetheless, there is currently no consensus on which risk-classes may be most
suitable. While insurers have experience in underwriting life insurance policies, it
remains the case that some conventionally-used factors are difficult to verify, for
example lifestyle habits or participation in hazardous activities like sky diving. Certain
risk factors are also mutable, such as smoking, which leaves insurers susceptible to
buyer fraud.61 In addition, there are factors not explored in other forms of insurance
pricing that tend to help explain longevity; for instance, several studies have found that
intelligent people live longer (Deary 2008; Hauser and Palloni 2010). Notably, Brown
and McDaid (2003) identify 10 potential risk-classes, including education, income, and
occupation, race, health behavior, and religion, based on a literature review of mortality
studies.62 Among this list, however, several factors are possibly correlated while other
61

Mutable factors are those which can be modified by the individual, and thus hard to verify. This is in
contrast to fixed factors. See Bond and Crocker (1991) for a detailed analysis of the implications of
mutable risk classification characteristics. In the context of annuity policies, an analogy is a person who
starts to smoke heavily in order to pass of as someone who is shorter-lived in order to qualify for a lower
annuity premium.
62
Base on a review of 45 empirical papers, Brown and McDaid (2003) highlight 10 factors that seem
important in predicting mortality after retirement, in addition to age and sex. They are (in no particular
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factors (e.g. health behavior) are not easily measurable. Also, the study did not give a
sense of which variables are more important than others.
The next section develops a risk-classification approach by picking out several
“readily-measurable” risk factors that may explain longevity. “Readily-measurable”
factors includes exogenous variables (like birth region, race, and parental factors), or
predetermined factors (like education), or objectively-measured factors (like body mass
index and cognition). These factors are desirable from an insurer’s standpoint because
they are not too costly to collect, easy-to-verify, and also tend to be difficult to fake.
This helps to address issues such as the costs of underwriting and buyer fraud.

3.2 Data and Methodology
To study predictors of mortality among adults near retirement, I use data from
the Health and Retirement Study.63 The HRS is an ongoing panel study of Americans
over the age of 50 conducted every other year since 1992, and it features questions on
health, economic status, retirement plans, cognition, pensions, family structure, and
expectations. The baseline birth cohort interviewed comprised respondents born 1931 –
1941; other cohorts were added in later waves. This paper focuses on individuals in the
baseline cohort who were surveyed biannually from 1992 through 2008, providing nine
waves of panel data. 64 The initial response rate in 1992 is 82%, and subsequent

order): race, education, income, occupation, marital status, religion participation, health behaviors
(lifestyle and use of health services), smoking, alcohol, and obesity.
63
See Juster and Suzman (1995) and HRS (2008) for details about the HRS multistage sample design,
enrollments, implementation, and response rates.
64
The HRS sample cohort (those first interviewed in 1992) comprised 12,521 respondents, including
spouses (HRS Tracker 2009, p.19) After excluding 2,770 respondents not born between 1931 and 1941,
and 470 proxy respondents, the reduced sample is 9,281.
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reinterview response rates are well above 90% on average (HRS 2008). Out of a
possible sample of 9,281 respondents, I exclude 11 persons because of faulty or
incomplete information on survival status, and 223 respondents (2.4%) with no
available follow-up data. The analysis sample is consequently restricted to 9,047
respondents. Appendix Table 3.1 provides basic descriptive statistics.
Measures
Survival status and duration. All-cause mortality is the outcome of interest.
HRS tracking efforts, along with a linkage to the National Death Index, allows mortality
to be measured very accurately between survey waves. Death is defined as the “time-tofailure” event, based on the reported month/year of death and respondents’ wave-bywave vital status in the Tracker 2008 (v1.0) file.65 No information on the cause of death
was obtained. In the small number of cases where the exact date of death is unknown
( =10 with no information and another =5 with death year only), a death year is
imputed based on the respondent’s specific wave-by-wave vital statuses, and a death
month using a random integer from 1 to 12.66 If an individual is known to be alive in a
given year, her survival status is carried back if it is missing in earlier waves. Subjects
who cannot be identified as deceased, or who survived through 2008 are considered

65

For the 1,905 failure events, 88.2% (or 1,680 cases) of the death years are obtained from HRS records,
11.3% (215) from NDI records, and 0.5% (10) imputed based on the wave-by-wave vital status. We rely
primarily on the year/month of death obtained by HRS through interviews with surviving spouses, or exit
interviews with surviving relatives. Where exit interviews are either not obtained, or incomplete, we use
the NDI information also available from the HRS Tracker file. The procedure is consistent with HRS’
advice that both sources of information (namely HRS and NDI) should be used to classify vital status in
any analysis (HRS Tracker 2009, p. 12). In addition, HRS also seeks matches to the NDI for persons who
were reported as deceased or who are not known to be alive through contact during tracking. Accordingly,
we rely on the NDI alive/deceased flags, and death match scores to verify respondent vital status in 2008.
66
These respondents were assumed to have died in the year between the two-year interval where their
vital status switched from ‘alive (or presumed alive)’ in one wave to ‘dead’ in the next wave.
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censored. Event variables indicating failure by wave is coded “1” if the individual died
in that wave, “0” if the individual was alive and responded to an interview, and
“missing” otherwise.67 All time variables including interview dates and death dates are
expressed in months.
Age and sex. The initial risk variables of interest are those currently used in
annuity pricing: age and sex. Both are defined at baseline and available from Tracker
2008. In particular, baseline age (representing birth cohort) is modeled as a continuous
variable, and separately as categorical dummies, to test the difference in effects. Three
sets of risk adjustments are then introduced to empirically determine their associations
with mortality: conventional exogenous factors, less-conventional exogenous factors,
and conventional endogenous factors.68
Conventional, readily-measurable factors. These include race (white/nonwhite),
education (≥12/<12 years), whether married (no/yes), prior health history, and BMI
(underweight/normal weight (ref.)/overweight). They are so-called conventional
because these sociodemographic variables are commonly used as controls. 69 The
correlations between race and mortality, and education and mortality are well
documented (Preston et al. 1996; Sorlie et al. 1992; Deaton and Paxson 2001; Kitagawa
and Hauser 1973). In general, these correlations work in the direction that whites live
longer than blacks, and more highly educated live longer than less educated individuals.
67

The event variable is coded “missing” as long as there was no response in a wave. This could be
because respondents have permanently attrited from the study, or they failed to respond to interview
during a particular wave but were known to be alive in a later wave. For the latter, their alive status is not
imputed into the “missing” since I have no information on the time-varying covariates in that missing
wave.
68
These variables are all obtained from the RAND version J dataset (RAND 2010).
69
For instance, Idler and Angel (1990), Hurd and McGarry (2002), Glymour et al. (2008), and Sloan et al.
(2010).
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For older individuals near retirement, it is posited that education and marital status are
predetermined factors. Educational attainment is a reasonable proxy for lifetime
financial resources, and appropriate since other social-economic status (SES) measures
(current income, current wealth, and current occupation) are probably endogenous.
Likewise, I control on prior health history instead of subjective self-assessments of
current health.70 Health history is obtained from doctor-diagnosed disease conditions
(whether a doctor ever told them they have chronic diseases such as hypertension,
diabetes, arthritis, chronic lung disease, stroke, or heart attack). Prior literature suggests
that such “ever-have” disease conditions are highly predictive of mortality.71 BMI is
also included since it can be measured objectively and easily, and is highly relevant
given that a current issue of interest is how obesity relates to mortality and morbidity
among older adults.72
Unconventional, readily-measurable factors. These include birth region
(Northeast (ref.), Midwest, South, West, Foreign-born), cognition scores (0-40),
parental education (≥12/<12 years), and parental longevity. Birth place/region is seldom
70

Some studies have shown that objective measures are better predictors of mortality than subjective
measures. For example, using a broad-based sample of U.S. adults aged 25–74 years from the National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, Idler and Angel (1990) find that age, race, smoking,
unemployment, alcohol use, illness symptoms, and marital status, are more predictive of survival than
either self-assessed health.
71
Using waves 1 and 2 of the HRS, Hurd and McGarry (2002) find that ever-have disease conditions
especially cancer, heart attack, stroke, and diabetes to be highly predictive of mortality among individuals
age 46-65. The study also shows low/high BMI to be associated with increased mortality although both
variables were not statistically significant in the logit regressions. Chronic illnesses and categorical
variables for BMI are similarly used to predict mortality for the HRS sample in other studies (e.g. Dupre
et al. 2009, and Siegel et al. 2003). Although these variables are self-reported in the HRS survey, they are
still arguably objective since weight and height are anthropometric measures, and the ever-have disease
condition question is phrased in terms of a doctor diagnosis.
72
The three BMI categories are based on the widely-adopted World Health Organization definition of
underweight (BMI<18.5), normal weight (18.5≤BMI<25), overweight (25≤BMI<30), and obese
(BMI≥30). See SOA (2010) for an excellent review of empirical studies on obesity and its relation to
mortality and morbidity.
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investigated as a predictor of mortality possibly because it is not available in many
datasets. Most studies using HRS data did not control for this variable; Sloan et al.
(2010), however, find that being foreign-born is associated with lower mortality hazards.
Similarly, parental SES factors are not commonly used by researchers perhaps because
adult mortality is believed to be better predicted by personal factors. Nonetheless,
parental longevity has been shown to affect subjective survival expectations which in
turn predict mortality (e.g. Hurd and McGarry 2002). Thus I control for parental
education as well as parental longevity since they are exogenous and may turn out to be
suitable risk-classes.73
Another explanatory variable of interest is cognitive ability, since it has been
demonstrated that intelligent people live longer (Deary 2008). Among the various
pathways proposed are that people with higher intelligence may be more wellorganized, conscientious individuals; they may also tend to be more educated, work in
healthier environments, and engage in healthier behavior (do not smoke, exercise, better
diets, avoid accidents). Thus, cognition is a plausible risk-class for annuitants (who tend
to be older adults) and an added advantage is that cognition is objectively-measured in
the HRS. 74
73

HRS contains information on the parents’ vital status and current age (age at death if deceased). I create
a continuous variable using parent’s current age (or age at death) minus sex-specific life expectancy,
divided by 10. The life expectancy used for fathers is age 65, which is an average of the life expectancies
of a 15-year old male and 30-year old male in 1931 and 1941, weighted by the respondent sample
composition. The life expectancy used for mothers is age 69. For example, mother’s longevity will be
negative if the mother died before 69 but positive if the mother survived past 69. Parents’ vital status is
not used directly because it is dependent on the respondent’s age at time of interview and thus not
reflective of parental longevity.
74
The HRS is one of the first national health surveys to measure cognitive health at the population level,
and cognitive tests are administered based on well-validated measures developed from psychological
research on intelligence and cognition (Herzog and Wallace 1997). In this paper, cognition scores are
obtained from the Imputation of Cognitive Functioning Measures 1992-2006 (V1.0) dataset which
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Conventional, endogenous factors. Prior research has emphasized the
importance of self-ratings and self-assessments of health in predicting mortality (e.g.
Idler and Benyamini 1997). Despite endogenous factors not being the focus of this
paper, it is important to assess how their inclusion may affect the predetermined and/or
exogenous covariates. Specifically, I use self-reported health (excellent (ref.), very good,
good, fair, and poor), whether currently smoke (no/yes), ever smoked, and ever drink.
Estimation Models
Proportional hazard (PH) regression analysis is used to (1) assess the bivariate
relationship of each additional predictor variable with longevity, controlling for age and
sex; and (2) construct a multivariate equation estimating the independent effects of the
more detailed list of prognostic factors. An important strength of the hazard framework
is its ability to properly treat right-censored data. Respondents who survived the entire
observational window from baseline to 2008 were treated as censored after their 2008
wave interview. For others not known to be dead but who attrited from the study at
various time points, their data are censored as of the last interview date. Consider the
general form of the PH function:
∙ exp
where

,

(1)

is the resultant hazard rate for the

time and the subject’s vector of covariates
force of mortality).

th

subject in the data, given survival

. It is also called the mortality risk (or

is the baseline hazard function (i.e. hazard when all

contains imputations for cognitive functioning data for HRS 1992 through 2006 (Fisher et al. 2009). In
1992 and 1994, only questions pertaining to a respondent’s memory skills (immediate / delayed word
recall) were asked. As such, the cognition score defined at baseline is the 1992 memory status score
(scale 0-40). From 1996 onwards, the HRS included additional questions pertaining to a respondent’s
mental status (e.g. Serial 7s test, backwards counting etc.).
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independent variables are set to their reference categories), and

is the vector of

regression coefficients to be estimated. Equation (1) states that the death hazard that
subject faces is multiplicatively proportional to the hazard everyone faces, modified
by his personal characteristics expressed as a vector

.

Within the general class of PH models, I specifically estimate two types. First,
the Cox (semi-parametric) model is employed because of its flexibility (it does not
require assumptions about the underlying hazard function); the shape of the hazard
function

is unconstrained. Cox models have been widely applied in previous

mortality studies using the HRS data (e.g. Sloan et al. 2010; Dupre et al. 2009; Lee et al.
2008; Siegel et al. 2003; and Mehta et al. 2003). Second, I consider a parametric
alternative by imposing a Gompertz form on the underlying hazard function. It is welldocumented that in past-middle adult ages (age 40 – 90) the mortality curve displays a
regular and nearly exponential increase that can be represented by the Gompertz
function (Gompertz 1825; Preston et al. 2001; Bongaarts and Feeney 2002).75 Thus, the
Gompertz form is suitable since the sample of HRS respondents is age 51 – 77 over the
observational window. 76
The Gompertz PH model is implemented with the following hazard and survivor
functions:

75

The Gompertz model might actually underestimate mortality at ages under 40 and overestimate
mortality at the oldest ages over 80 or 90. The Makeham-Gompertz and logistic models have been
proposed to address these deviations. Nonetheless, for many purposes, the Gompertz model provides a
satisfactory fit to adult mortality rates for ages between 40 and 90. I refer interested readers to Preston et
al. (2001).
76
Using Cox-Snell (Cox and Snell 1968) residuals, I also find that the ‘Gompertz’ form fits the data best
compared to other parametric forms (e.g. the ‘Weibull’, ‘Log-logistic’, and ‘Lognormal’). The cumulative
hazard function (estimated with Cox-Snell residuals using the Gompertz form) lies very close to the 45degree reference line.
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exp
exp
where

e

exp

,
e

(2)
1 ,

(3)

is the additional parameter to be estimated from the data. Empirically, I find

that the Gompertz function fits the survival function for both sexes exceptionally well in
part because the sample respondents are all above age 50; most however have not
reached the advanced ages of 80 or 90 by the 2008 wave. Results from the Cox
regressions are nearly identical to those from the Gompertz approach (further evidence
that the Gompertz function appropriately parameterizes the underlying baseline hazard);
hence I present only the latter. Moreover, the parametric approach allows us to obtain
more efficient estimates of the coefficients than the semi-parametric model, because it
exploits all information in the data; the Cox model only compares subjects at failure
times. Statistical analyses are conducted using STATA 11.0 software,77 and weighted to
account for over-sampling of blacks, Hispanics, and Floridians in the HRS.
One important issue to consider in the estimation is whether the hazard functions
for males and females have different shapes. If the hazards for sexes are not
proportional, then subsequent estimations need to be separated by sex. Results from
fitting stratified models reveal that the hazards are proportional and thus a combined
analysis is reasonable.78 Furthermore, hazard plots for both sexes are nearly parallel
over the entire follow-up period. Another concern might be the nonlinearity of age and
77

See Cleves et al. (2010) for an overview of survival analysis using STATA’s STSET procedures.
To test for differences in shape between the hazards for males and females, I include an ancillary
gamma parameter in the Gompertz distribution to allow both the scale and shape of hazard to vary by sex
(complete stratification). I find that coefficients do not differ, irrespective of whether we constrain the
hazards to be of the same shape, or allow them to vary. This implies that the effect of sex on the shape of
the hazard is not significant, up to a scale change. Stratification involving the Cox model leads to the
same conclusion.
78
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the interaction of age with analysis time.79 Nonetheless, analyses not reported in detail
here show that higher order age variables and time-age interaction terms are not
significant (p>.05). In order to properly estimate the baseline survivor function, the age
variable is transformed so that the baseline hazard corresponds to a 50-year-old
retiree.80
In what follows, I first consider a specification (call it “M1”) with only
information currently used by U.S. annuity providers i.e. age and sex. Then, the three
blocks of additional prognostic factors are sequentially added to the PH model in the
following order: “M2” adds the set of conventional, readily-measurable covariates; “M3”
adds the block of less-conventional covariates; and finally “M4” adjusts for
conventional, endogenous risk factors. In this way, any changes in the relation between
the various control variables and mortality can be observed, while evaluating the fit of
each specification.

3.3 Results: Survival Analysis
Of the sample of 9,047 HRS respondents, 6,547 survived, 1,905 died, and 595
permanently attrited by the 2008 wave. The 16-year mortality rate is 21.1%; 81 the
attrited group is added to the denominator because it is observed that the bulk of
79

Age may interact with follow-up time; for example, a respondent who is older at enrollment may be
more likely to die during follow-up (Dickman et al. 2004). If so, then the proportional hazards assumption
is not appropriate for the age covariate since the hazard ratio will differ according to analysis time. In this
model, the age* interaction term is not statistically significant, controlling for age and sex.
80
I use baseline age minus 50. The origin from which the covariate is measured impacts the baseline
cumulative hazard and survivor function because it changes how “all covariates equal zero” is defined. If
age is unadjusted, the baseline hazard will correspond to a newborn.
81
This mortality estimate (spanning Waves 1 to 9) appears reasonable given that the overall cumulative
mortality for the HRS sub-sample up to Wave 7 is 15.9% (HRS 2008). The confirmed mortality rate is
22.5% (excludes the attrited group from both the nominator and denominator).
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attriters had requested removal from the HRS survey in-person whilst alive. 82 In
comparison, the 1992 lifetable mortality rate (weighted to reflect sample composition)
is 23.5%. Mortality rates in the HRS sample are slightly lower than lifetable rates since
HRS initially surveyed only the community-based population, which excludes longterm care facility residents. Figure 3.1 shows that 70 percent of males and 78 percent of
traced females survived the entire 16 years of follow-up. Also, the men’s survivor curve
lies below that of the women’s, indicating that mortality risks are greater for males at
every age. The observation that females have a better survival experience is consistent
with observed longer life expectancies for women in the population at large. The
survivor functions (Kaplan–Meier curves) in the Figure are also gently sloped which
suggest that the increase in mortality risk over time is gradual.83 An important feature of
the Kaplan–Meier curve is that it accounts for right-censoring, which occurs if a
respondent withdraws from the study. The longest observation in this dataset survived
201 months (16.75 years), and was ultimately censored.
[Figure 3.1 here]
Proportional Hazards Regressions
Table 3.1 reports the results from fitting the Gompertz PH model for different sets of
prognostic factors. The estimated hazard ratios (or odds ratios) give the partial effects of
82

The Tracker file records the detailed result of each interview attempt as of the close of the field period
by wave, although the coding across waves was inconsistent. From the 2002 wave, it classifies
respondents’ removal from the study according to these categories: respondent requests removal in person;
request through informant, request through proxy, because tracking was exhausted, or because a proxy
cannot be identified. I observe that a large percentage (above 93%) had asked to be removed from the
sample in-person, and only a handful of cases were lost to tracking. As a result, the extent of unaccounted
deaths among the attriters in the sample is minimal.
83
One reason might be that the deaths observed over the time window are of individuals who die before
their life expectancies (age 79-81). The average observed death age is 66. In other words, the subjects
have not reached their ‘critical’ years by the end of 2008.

89

the explanatory variables on the odds of mortality. 84 A hazard ratio larger than 1
indicates that an increased hazard (probability of death) is associated with the
explanatory variable, and a hazard ratio less than 1 indicates that a decreased hazard is
associated with the explanatory variable. Accompanying 95 percent confidence
intervals are also reported. It is apparent from Table 3.1 that probability of death is
significantly higher for males and older people. Specifically in Column (M1), being a
male is associated with a 62% higher mortality risk (p<.01) as compared to a female,
and aging each year beyond age 50 is associated with 9% increased risk. In addition, the
partial effects show that age and sex continue to be significant predictors of mortality
even when more covariates are added in subsequent specifications.
[Table 3.1 here]
A better way to evaluate these hazard ratios is in the context of the baseline
hazard function since the absolute increase in mortality risk depends on the size of
baseline hazard. Figure 3.2 illustrates the hazard functions of four individuals of
different attributes. The solid line is the baseline hazard depicting the hazard rates for
our baseline case: a female age 50 in 1992. Her instantaneous probability of death starts
low at age 50 and increases to about .0011 by the time she is age 66 (in 2008). Turning
to consider the case of a male who is also age 50 in 1992, the Figure shows that his
hazard function lies just slightly above the baseline hazard. This is because although he
faces 1.62 times more risk than the female, the baseline hazard is small such that a 62%
increase in risk does not create a large impact. In contrast, a 60-year old male has a
84

For a categorical variable, the hazard ratio compares the (mortality) hazard rate for respondents with
the factor to the hazard rate for those without it. For a continuous variable, the hazard ratio represents the
increase in hazard associated with a single unit of change in the explanatory variable.
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hazard function that lies far above the baseline hazard. He faces about 3.84 times more
the baseline case at any given point in time and has a hazard rate of .004 by the time he
is age 76 (in 2008). More generally, the Figure shows closely parallel lines which
support the proportionality assumption. The monotonically increasing functions are also
consistent with the Gompertz parameterization.
[Figure 3.2 here]
Column (M2) adds race, education, whether married, prior health history, and
weight – all of which are highly significant (p<.001). Lower mortality hazards are
associated with respondents who completed high school (HR=0.73; 95% CI=0.66, 0.82),
or who are married (HR=0.69; 95% CI=0.62, 0.77). On the other hand, people who are
nonwhite, underweight, or had chronic diseases such as lung disease, diabetes, and heart
attack face higher mortality risks.85 In particular, being underweight (symptomatic of an
underlying disease) increases the risk of death by 2.9 times as compared to the reference
normal weight group. It may appear surprising that obesity (BMI ≥ 30) is not associated
with an excess risk of death. This is because the extent of obesity matters: several
studies have shown statistically significant associations between all-cause mortality and
BMI in severely obese groups (BMI ≥ 35), but not for the mildly obese group.86 Overall,
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Our reported hazard ratios are consistent with those in prior studies. For example, using a sample of
HRS male respondents, Sloan et al. (2010) report hazard ratios of 0.945 for with high school education,
0.794 for married, 1.170 for blacks, 1.006 for baseline age, and 0.83 for foreign-born.
86
Consistent with the findings here, prior studies that used HRS data did not find statistically significant
differences in the mortality of overweight and mildly obese groups versus the normal weight group
(Reuser et al. 2008; Mehta and Chang 2009). For example, Mehta and Chang (2009) find that respondents
who are Class I obese (BMI 30-34.9) do not face excess mortality risk but those who are severely obese
(Class II/III obesity with BMI ≥35) do. That study concluded that obesity is not a significant cause of
mortality in the HRS population because there are relatively few people who are extremely obese.
Applying finer classes of obesity in this present paper, I find that the ‘Class III obese’ variable has a
hazard ratio above one but the effect is not significant (results not reported in detail here).
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M2 has substantially better fit than M1: the Wald test statistic (

) reported in the Table

shows a six-fold increase and the difference is highly significant (1,287, 16 df – 191, 2
df = 1,096, 14 df, p<.000).87
Column (M3) adds the set of less conventionally used variables, including birth
region, cognitive score, and parental factors. A ten-point increase in cognitive score is
associated with a 26% lower mortality hazard (p<.01). Also significant is birth region:
respondents not born in the US, or born in the West region, face 26 – 37% less mortality
risk as compared to those born in the Northeast region of North America. Results also
show that father’s longevity is predictive of mortality; a respondent whose father
survives 10 years past age 65 faces 5% lower hazard. Interestingly, a stepwise
procedure (not reported in detail here) reveals that the inclusion of cognitive score is the
key reason for the diminished effect of race on mortality (odds ratio falls from 1.18,
p<.01 to 1.14, p<.05). This suggests that nonwhite HRS respondents are likely to have
lower cognitive scores and to die younger.88 If so, this enhances the attractiveness of
cognition as pricing factor since not only is it objectively-measured, it also act as a
proxy for an important demographic characteristic like race. The overall improvement
in fit (Wald test statistic) is modest but statistically significant (p<.000). In essence,
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The test statistic is based on the chi-square test that at least one of the predictors' regression coefficients
is not equal to zero in the model. It is also a measure of model fit – a larger statistic indicates better fit. In
nested models, the model with more parameters will always fit at least as well as the one with fewer
parameters. Whether the fuller model fits significantly better and thus preferred, can be determined by
deriving the p-value of the difference between the test statistics. The Wald chi-square statistic (a variant
of the likelihood-ratio chi-square) is used as it accounts for the clustering across observations for the
same subject.
88
This is consistent with the findings in Rodgers et al. (2003). Using the 1993 and 1998 waves of the
AHEAD sample in the HRS, their regression analysis on cognitive score show that being AfricanAmerican is associated with an estimated decline of about 0.49 points on the total cognitive score per
year, while being Hispanic is associated with a 0.35 points decrease.
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model M3 represents the complete specification with the proposed set of readilymeasurable factors that can be used to price annuities, in addition to age and sex.
The set of endogenous controls are introduced in Column (M4) to test how their
inclusion affects estimates of previously-controlled covariates. Results show that selfrated health and smoking are significant (p<.01). In particular, a person who reports
“poor” health faces triple the risk (HR=3.02; 95% CI=2.38, 3.81) of someone who
reports “excellent” health. The inclusion of self-rated health also makes the race and
education variables lose statistical significance. 89 Interestingly, pairwise correlation
analyses reveal that respondents who rate their own health poorly tend to be better
educated, and are white (rather than black or Hispanic). This observation concords with
Dowd and Zajacova (2007) who find that individuals across SES strata differ in how
they evaluate their health. In particular, lower health self-ratings are more strongly
associated with mortality for adults with higher education and/or higher income. The
useful takeaway here is that self-rated health is not likely to be useful as an additional
pricing factor – it is subjective and its explanatory power is derived from existing SES
factors. Current smoking increases hazards by 76%. While its strong independent effect
on mortality enhances its usefulness as a risk-class, the need for blood tests to verify
smoker status makes it less palatable than the set of readily-measurable factors already
identified in Model 3.
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A stepwise procedure (not reported in detail here) shows that the addition of self-rated health to the
model has the greatest impact on existing covariates. In relation, the pairwise correlations are 0.19 (selfrated health and nonwhite) and -0.32 (self-rated health and education). Both correlations are significant at
1% level.
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Table 3.1 reports the parameter , which controls the shape of the baseline
hazard. The value of

varies depending on the model specifications, but the key is that

is a positive value indicating monotone hazard functions that increase exponentially
with time.90 Because it has been verified in Section 3 that the male and female hazards
have the same shape, a unisex
related issue is then whether

will be applied in the subsequent pricing simulations. A
differs significantly for the younger versus older

respondents, since there is a maximum possible age gap of 12 years. To test for this agecovariates interaction, I divide the respondents into two groups: ages 50-57 (two-thirds
of the sample) and ages 58-62. The number of deaths in both groups is pretty similar.
Results are shown in Appendix Table 3.2.
Slight differences emerge: for the older group, the age covariate is not
statistically significant (HR=1.04, 95% CI=0.97, 1.12, p>.10),91 and the negative effect
of chronic diseases and low BMI on mortality seems less intense.92 For instance, an
older person with cancer faces 1.7 times the mortality risk of someone without
(compared to 2.3 for a younger counterpart). One possible explanation is that at
advanced ages, physical conditions become less predictive of mortality (everyone
eventually becomes frail and disease-ridden), whereas mental health emerges as a more
significant determinant. Although the dataset we use precludes our validating this
surmise, it appears that cognitive score and years of education (proxies of mental ability)
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This is consistent with Figure 3.2.
The magnitude of the odds ratio, however, is similar to that for the younger group.
92
Our results show that the hazard ratios for six of the eight chronic disease conditions are lower for the
older group. This is consistent with results in Lee et al. (2008). Using HRS data, that study finds that as
age increases, the ability of chronic conditions to predict mortality declines rapidly. Chronic conditions
are stronger predictors of death for younger participants (aged 50-59 years) than for older participants.
91
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predict mortality slightly better for the older group. But overall, there are no substantial
differences in the hazard ratios or

between the two age groups; thus, I proceed with

the combined sample.
Improved Predictive Ability from Risk-class Pricing
One of the objectives of this paper is to explore the possible impact of pricing
annuity benefits using additional risk-classes vis-à-vis existing pricing factors (age and
sex). To do so, I compare the values of adjusted

across the four models. 93

Controlling only for age and sex in “M1” explain about 6.7% (SE 0.0093) of variance in
mortality outcomes. In contrast, “M2” and “M3” have adjusted

values of 29.7% (SE

0.0139) and 30.6% (SE 0.0138) respectively. In other words, implementing the 12 to 18
additional risk-classes will allow an insurer to explain about five times more variation
in mortality, suggesting that much prognostic information is carried by the additional
variables.
To assess the relative contributions of individual predictors, I remove variables
from “M3” one at a time – in the order that reduced

the least at each step. For the

given sample, diabetes is the most important predictor of mortality, followed (in this
order) by lung disease, heart disease, sex, age, marital status, high blood, cancer, own
schooling, BMI, psychiatric condition, cognition, birth region, stroke, father’s longevity,
race, mother’s education, father’s education, arthritis, and mother’s longevity. This
ranking suggests that prior health history (other than arthritis) and demographic
93

The values of adjusted
are found at the bottom of Table 3.1. In the context of censored survival data,
measures how much of the variation in outcome in a PH model is accounted for through
the adjusted
the prognostic index ( ), adjusting for the dimension of the model. See Royston (2006) for details. The
Harrell’s and Somers’ statistics for Cox PH models are not suitable for use with our weighted
analysis.
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variables (particularly age, sex, and marital status) are important predictors of mortality
for people close to retirement. Objectively-measured variables such as BMI and
cognition also rank moderately well, which lends weight to their use in annuity pricing.
Race does not rank highly on this list, probably because it serves as a proxy for SES,
which in this case may have been largely captured by the education variable. Parental
education is ranked low, which is not surprising since the mortality of older adults may
no longer be strongly associated with parental SES.
In what follows, the ten best-ranked additional risk-classes are combined with
age and sex to form a “risk-class pricing” scheme.94 This new model specification with
a total of 12 variables has an adjusted

value of 29.7% (SE 0.0137). It is posited that

this “risk-class pricing” scheme which is richer in information will allow insurers to
derive more accurate mortality predictions than the “age-sex pricing” scheme. This
paper proposes a novel approach to make this assessment by comparing age-at-death
prediction intervals. To the best of my knowledge, this procedure has not been
demonstrated in previous population-based studies of mortality. Studying age-at-death
intervals is of interest since insurers will want to pinpoint, as accurately as possible,
how long annuity payouts need to be made.
Age-at-death probability density functions are derived from post-PH regression
estimates. These density functions show the relative likelihood of the individual dying
at each point in time, i.e. the probability of dying before month
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1 given survival to

Results (not presented) show that this ranking using adjusted R2 is consistent with other variable
selection methods. Stepwise and forward selection procedures both confirm that parental education,
mother’s longevity, arthritis, and birth region are the least significant variables. A slight difference is that
the forward selection method ranks ‘stroke’ as one of the top 12 factors in lieu of ‘own schooling’.
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month . Formally, let

denote the age of a retiree who purchases an individual life

annuity at time 0. A discrete random variable associated with her future lifetime is
where discrete time periods are measured in months. 95 The survival function and
density function of

are, respectively:

Pr

,

50,

0, 1, 2, …,

,
where

is the probability that

survival probability), and
constraint of

will attain age

(4)
(5)

(or so-called cumulative

is the one-period mortality rate at age

. The

50 is consistent with the minimum age of the given sample. The

assumed terminal age that an individual can live up to is 120. Essentially, Equation (4)
is the discrete-form equivalent of Equation (3). Fitted estimates of the survival function
are derived for price simulations discussed in the next section. The focus here is the
fitted estimates of the density function derived from Equation (5).
It is also useful to introduce the notion of a ‘risk-group’. Individuals who share a
common density function are called a risk-group. In the context of annuities, a riskgroup with a longer lifespan is ‘riskier’ than another. Given that the sample consists of a
number of risk-groups, the objective here is to analyze how the density functions
estimated under the two different annuity pricing schemes will differ, in the presence of
such heterogeneity. In particular, consider four distinct risk-groups profiled as follows:
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In actuarial terminology, this is called the curtate-future-lifetime of
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. See Bowers (1997).

(i) High longevity-risk: 55-year-old female, no disease history, slightly
overweight, married, completed high school (HS-educated), aboveaverage cognition.
(ii) Average risk: 55-year-old female, no disease history, normal weight but
is not married, not HS-educated, average cognition. (Note that this
mortality profile is obtained by setting all 10 additional risk variables at
their reference categories.)
(iii) Low risk: 55-year-old female, history of cancer, underweight, is not
married, not HS-educated, below-average cognition.
(iv) Very low risk: 58-year-old male, overweight, has heart disease, high
blood and psychiatric illness, not married, not HS-educated, belowaverage cognition.
Figure 3.3 plots the density functions for each risk-group. For the first three
subgroups, the density curves estimated from age-sex pricing alone (dotted lines) are
identical; the benchmark is the density function for an average 55-year old female. In
contrast, estimates obtained from “risk-class pricing” (solid lines) vary significantly
across the three risk-groups; the subgroup with longer longevity is expected to die later
than others. Overall, this enables readers to visualize exactly how incorporating more
risk-classes improves predictive power: insurers are not only able to distinguish across
risk profiles, but also obtain tighter age-at-death prediction intervals (narrower
distributions). In addition, the solid line functions reveal higher peaks implying that the
most probable ages of death are associated with greater weight (higher probability
levels).
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[Figure 3.3 here]
The bottom-right plot in the Figure illustrates the density curves for a very lowlongevity risk-group; here we characterize this as an older male with a history of several
diseases. In such cases, substantial differences in mortality predictions can emerge: for
instance, “risk-class pricing” predicts a most probable age-at-death at 64, whereas “agesex pricing” yields a prediction of age 83. Having selected suitable risk-classes and
demonstrated how incorporating these additional factors will lead to improved age-atdeath predictions, the next step is to analyze how implementing these risk-classes
affects the financial value of annuities for different demographic groups.

3.4 Price Simulations on a Purely Financial Basis
This section briefly describes the actuarial valuation approach for life annuities
and presents simulation results for a hypothetical cohort of 65-year-old potential
annuity buyers.96 It should be noted that this pool of individuals is not related in any
way to the earlier sample of HRS respondents. I first simulate the annuity benefit flows
accruing to a variety of risk-groups, and then simulate the annuity premiums that would
be charged under different actuarially fair pricing schemes. These results are combined
to obtain the money’s worth ratio for various risk-groups under alternative pricing
schemes assuming no loading.
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Earlier studies that perform annuity value simulations have similarly focused on a cohort of same-age
annuitants. For instance, Brown (2003) uses a cohort of 67-year-olds. Mitchell et al. (1999) and Turra and
Mitchell (2008) focus on a cohort of 65-year-olds. Age 65 is selected here because it is closer to the
expected retirement age of the sample of HRS respondents (mean=63.5, SD=3.65) used in the earlier
regression analyses.
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Benefit Flows to Annuitants
Consider a standard, nominal, whole life annuity that pays $1 per month as long
as the annuitant is alive. The first payout starts at time

0 when the annuity is

purchased. This is the only product available to individuals in this simulation. The
benefits to annuity purchasers in the same risk-group can be quantified as follows:
$1 ∙

∙

,

(6)

where EPDV refers to the expected present discounted value of future annuity payouts.
In addition,

is the set of cumulative survival

is the discount factor,

probabilities for a risk-group,

is the age at which the annuity is purchased, and is

time expressed in months. In actuarial terminology, the EPDV is called the actuarial
present value of a life annuity and the upper bound of the summation is set to infinity by
convention. Equation (6) captures the present value of the series of annuity benefits that
an annuitant in a particular risk-group can expect to receive over her remaining lifetime.
Risk-groups can be defined using any combination of risk factors. For instance,
a broadly-defined risk-group might be ‘age 65, females’; their set of

can be

estimated from a PH regression that controls only for age and sex.97 Another example of
a risk-group would be ‘married, high-school educated, age 65, females’ – and any
female with these four characteristics would be in the group (even though some would
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Robustness checks are performed to determine if the fitted estimates of
are reflective of rates
reported in actuarial lifetables. Results (not presented) show that the fitted cumulative survival estimates
generated from the PH regression controlling only for age and sex (i.e. Model 1) are close to the survival
probabilities constructed from the Social Security Administration (SSA) birth cohort tables. The 1930 and
1940 sex-specific SSA cohort tables are used since the HRS sample respondents are born 1931-1941, and
are sourced from www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/as120/LifeTables_Tbl_7.html.
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be suffering from a disease and some would not). Their set of

is estimated

from a PH regression that controls for age, sex, education, and marital status. In the
simulations that follow, a nominal annual interest rate of 6% is assumed (this rate
reflects the average 30-year Treasury bond yield for the last 20 years) and I also present
sensitivity analysis using an alternative value of 4%.98 Further, the assumed terminal
age of survival is 120.99
Table 3.2 presents the simulated expected annuity benefits (or EPDV) for a
variety of risk-groups. The row in the middle shows that a 65-year-old annuity
purchaser, on average, can expect to receive $126 in annuity benefits. If the fact that
females live longer than males is accounted for, then plugging sex-specific survival
probabilities into Equation (6) reveals that the estimated EPDV for females is actually
$16 higher than that for males. If we further account for the education level of the
annuitant, then the EPDV of high-school educated groups will be larger than that of
non-high-school educated groups. The top and bottom rows of the Table draws a
contrast between a very long-lived group profiled by ‘females with no high blood,
married, and high-school-educated’ (EPDV $152) and a very short-lived group profiled
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The average 30-year Treasury bond yield from 1988 to 2010 is 6.3% (the bond was discontinued
between 2003 and 2005 but re-introduced in 2006). In recent years, yields have been falling. As at end
2010, the 30-year Treasury bond yield is 4.25%. Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release
(www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm). Prior studies (e.g. Mitchell et al. 1999) have similarly
used the 30-year Treasury bond yield to proxy a flat nominal term structure. The discount factor is
computed using
1⁄ 1
, where denotes the nominal interest rate. It is also assumed that the
insurer always earns exactly this rate on the assets backing the annuity, and so any profit or loss stems
solely from annuity pricing simulations and not from reinvestment risk.
99
A terminal age (denoted ) of 120 is appropriate for two reasons. First, it has been used as the limiting
age in official cohort lifetables from the U.S. Social Security Administration. Second, it appears to be a
reasonable choice for the sample here since the maximum death ages observed for deceased parents are
105 (father), and 110 (mother) suggesting it is plausible that HRS respondents can potentially live to 120.
In Equation (6), the upper bound of the summation can thus be alternatively expressed as
12.
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by ‘males with high blood, unmarried, and low-educated’ (EPDV $81). In essence, the
Table reflects a spectrum of longevity profiles in a heterogeneous cohort, although one
can easily imagine other forms of representative profiles.100
[Table 3.2 here]
Premiums Charged by Insurers
How premiums are set depends on the prevailing pricing scheme in the market.
To simplify the analysis, zero-loading is assumed so the insurer is assumed to set
premiums just sufficient to break-even for each benchmark group that it prices. 101
Table 3.3 illustrates the dollar premiums charged to the hypothetical pool of age 65
individuals under different pricing schemes for a $1/month life annuity. In an ‘age-only’
pricing scheme, the insurer will set a price based on the average survival probabilities of
65-year-olds. All annuity buyers will be charged the same premium of $126. Under
‘age-sex’ pricing, the insurer no longer charges a single price but now has to
differentiate between the sexes. The insurer uses the average survival probabilities of
65-year-old females to derive a premium of $134, and all female annuity purchasers
(whether they are married or unmarried, with disease or without) must pay $134.
Because of their lower average survival probabilities, males are charged a lower
premium of $117.
[Table 3.3 here]
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For example, ‘females with lung disease, underweight, and poor cognition’ will also fit the profile of a
very short-lived group.
101
Insurers typically add loadings to the insurance products they sell to cover administrative costs and to
incorporate some profit margin. Such loadings are borne by the consumers.
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Row 3 of the Table shows that if an ‘age-sex-education’ scheme is adopted
instead, there will be a total of four distinct prices after accounting for the different
permutations among the pricing factors; high-school educated females paying the
highest premium of $145. It is also important to note from this analysis that risk-groups
become more narrowly-defined when the pricing scheme becomes more detailed; for
example, it is not possible to compute a premium for a risk-group of 65-year old
females under ‘age-sex-education’ pricing.
Risk-based pricing essentially allows insurers to price-discriminate more finely
across different risk profiles. As pricing schemes incorporate more details, the schedule
of possible premiums offered by an insurer grows exponentially. The Table shows that
using six rating classes will result in 32 distinct prices ranging from $82-160. If all the
top 12 pricing factors are used, then there are possibly more than 4,000 distinct
premiums to account for the various permutations of 65-year old annuitants. All the
results in the Table assume zero-loads. Loads can be factored into the analysis, for
example, by assuming that they form a fixed percentage of the premium. If loads are
say 10%, then all simulated premiums simply decrease by 10%, in which case, the
relative prices charged to different buyers are unaffected.
Money’s Worth Ratios Results
To assess the financial value of annuities accruing to different demographic
groups, a metric called the “money’s worth ratio (MWR)” is employed. The MWR
measures the financial value of an annuity investment to the individual, and it is simply
the ratio of the EPDV over the annuity premium paid. If the MWR is less than 1, then
the individual is expected to receive less back in payouts than what she paid. If she
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decides to buy the annuity, she would anticipate receiving a negative expected transfer.
If MWR is greater than 1, then the annuitant would anticipate receiving a positive
expected transfer.
Table 3.4A presents the MWR values for different demographic groups under a
variety of pricing schemes. These values are derived using the simulated EPDV and
premium estimates discussed earlier. It is important to note that these are the values
available to individuals if they should decide to buy the annuities; thus this analysis
does not require the assumption that all individuals must annuitize. The key takeaway
from this Table is that shorter-lived annuity purchasers will be made financially better
off (and the longer-lived made worse off) when more detailed pricing schemes are
implemented. This is evidenced by focusing on the ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ risk-groups in the
Table which represents longer-lived and shorter-lived profiles respectively. Under agesex pricing, the MWR for the shorter-lived group is 0.693. MWR increases substantially
to 0.893 when additional factors such as education and marital status are used – this is
about a 29% increase in financial value for every dollar they invest in annuities. This is
because when pricing incorporates more personal characteristics, shorter-lived
individuals enjoy lower premiums that reflect their high mortality attributes. In contrast,
the longer-lived are charged higher premiums causing their MWR to decline. The
longer-lived risk-group has a MWR of 1.204 under ‘age-only’ pricing (scheme S1) but
only a MWR of 1.047 under the more detailed pricing scheme S4.
[Table 3.4 here]
An interesting observation is that the incremental gains achieved by the shorterlived exceed the incremental losses experienced by the longer-lived group. Moving
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progressively from scheme S2 to S4, the Table shows 13 to 15% gains in MWR for the
shorter-lived. These gains are substantial as compared to the modest declines of 3 to 5%
for the longer-lived. This suggests that the effect of adopting more factors in annuity
pricing in a heterogeneous population of annuity purchasers is likely to be uneven;
longer-lived groups will be made just slightly worse off but shorter-lived groups will be
disproportionately much better off. The intuition here is that it is generally harder to
increase one’s survival probability than to worsen it. Hazard ratios reveal that the
combined longevity advantage of being married, HS-educated, female, and without high
blood, decreases the risk of death by only 50% vis-à-vis the baseline individual. Yet,
having the exact opposite attributes (all else equal) increases the mortality risk of an
individual by 313%.102 In other words, the survival curve of the longer-lived will lie just
slightly above that of the baseline individual but the survival curve of the shorter-lived
will lie far below the baseline curve. This disparity in survival estimates results in the
premium falling more for the shorter-lived than it rising for the longer-lived when a
pricing factor is added.
In sum, the MWR analysis suggests two important reasons why more detailed
pricing may help reduce adverse selection in annuity markets. First, shorter-lived
groups will be induced to buy annuities. Where they may have stayed out of the annuity
market previously under simpler pricing, they may now decide to annuitize given
decent MWR values of 0.8 to 0.9. Moreover, as pricing schemes become progressively
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The computations are based on the hazard ratios in Column M2, Table 3.1. Death hazards are
multiplicatively proportional. Assuming all other factors are set at their reference categories, a married,
HS-educated, female without high blood has a mortality risk of 0.69*0.73*1*1=0.504 whereas an
unmarried, non-HS-educated, male who ever-had high blood has a mortality risk of 1*1*1.92*1.63=3.13.
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more detailed, the incremental gains in MWR (13-15%) accruing to these shorter-lived
groups are substantial. Second, longer-lived groups still have an incentive to annuitize
even when more detailed pricing is implemented. This is because the penalty that these
groups bear through higher premiums results in only modest financial losses of about 35%; moreover, they can still expect to enjoy positive expected transfers from
annuitization as MWR > 1. Sensitivity analysis reveals that these results remain robust
under a lower interest rate assumption (see Table 3.4B).
While the MWR is a useful metric, it ignores the insurance value that
individuals may derive from the elimination of longevity risk. The next section
describes a utility-based model and quantifies the utility gains accruing to different
demographic groups under the assumption of risk aversion. It assesses whether shorterlived groups may obtain utility gains from more detailed pricing schemes, and if so,
whether they are as substantial as the financial gains.

3.5 Price Simulations on a Utility-Adjusted Basis
This section primarily builds on the work by Brown (2001, 2003) and Mitchell
et al. (1999).103 In particular, I adopt the approach developed in these studies to quantify
the welfare gains of annuitization to an individual using a metric called the “annuity
equivalent wealth (AEW)”. Unlikely the MWR, the AEW is a utility-based measure of
annuity valuation and it has been shown in prior studies that individuals may find an
annuity to be welfare-enhancing even if MWR< 1.
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I am especially grateful to Jeffery R. Brown and Olivia S. Mitchell for use of the code for generating
utility-equivalent wealth values originating from Brown (2001).
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Closest to this present paper, Brown (2003) studies the utility-adjusted value of
annuitization for a cohort of 67-year-olds of heterogeneous mortality under two pricing
scenarios. Mortality is differentiated using sex, education, and race. 104 One pricing
scenario examined is unisex uniform pricing (which corresponds to age-only pricing)
and the other scenario is actuarially fair pricing for each and every separate
demographic group. This present paper aims to extend the empirical analysis on two
fronts: first, I consider intermediate pricing scenarios that lie between the two markers.
Thus the pricing scheme prevailing at any point in time may be more than actuarially
fair for some demographic groups and less than actuarially fair for other groups.105 This
is perhaps a better reflection of reality since insurers are likely to adopt additional riskclasses progressively as depicted by the intermediate pricing scenarios. Second, I
examine a more diverse set of demographic groups. In particular, I differentiate
mortality along more demographic lines, including education, marital status, and
disease condition, which serves to broaden the analysis in useful ways. 106 In what
follows, I describe the multi-period, stochastic life-cycle model used to evaluate the
insurance value of an annuity under uncertain lifetimes and simulate AEW results for
the hypothetical cohort of 65-year-olds.
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According to Brown (2003), education is selected in because it is a reasonable proxy for lifetime
resources and is also a predetermined variable for most retired individuals. Race is selected because it is
directly relevant to the politics of the Social Security debate in the U.S. This is consistent with the study’s
objective of assessing the utility implications of mandating annuitization in an environment of
heterogeneous mortality.
105
The pricing scheme will be actuarially fair for groups which are identified as benchmarks in that
particular scheme. These benchmark groups have been identified in Table 3.3 and have MWR values of
1.000 in Table 3.4.
106
Differentiating along more demographic lines increases the mortality heterogeneity between the ‘top’
and ‘bottom’ risk-groups, thus leading to a larger observed dispersion in MWR and AEW values. In
addition, the choice of factors matters; selecting factors that are less correlated will create greater
mortality heterogeneity between the risk-groups analyzed.
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Analytical Framework for AEW
At the posited retirement age of 65, the individual decides how much of her
initial wealth to annuitize. The retiree is assumed to be solving an expected utility
maximization problem. Formally, let

represent the one-period utility function

defined over real consumption,

is the probability that an individual survives to

period ( is expressed in years),

the time preference rate, and

the terminal age

(assume 120). Then, assuming additive separability over time, the value function
is defined as:
∙

,

1

(7)

subject to the following constraints:
(i)

is given,

(ii)

0, ∀ ,
1

(iii)
In this set of constraints,
period ,
annuity, and

(8)
.

is non-annuitized wealth in period ,

is the annuity income she receives in period

is consumption in

if she had purchased an

is the real interest rate. There is no expectation operator because the

survival probabilities have been explicitly accounted for, and there are no other sources
of uncertainty in this problem. In addition, as in prior studies, I assume no bequests, no
loadings, and no taxes in this setup. This value function at time

is the present

discounted value of expected utility evaluate along the optimal path. Knowing the
optimal decision in period allows one to find the optimal decision that maximizes the
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value function in period

1. The problem is thus solved numerically using backward

recursion from the final period, and may be expressed by the following recursive
Bellman equation:
,

1
where

is the one-period probability of surviving in period

(9)
1.

Consistent with prior studies, I apply standard methods of discretizing the
wealth space, and adopt the standard assumption that individuals exhibit constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA).107 The CRRA utility allows the simulation results to be
invariant to the level of wealth possessed by the individuals in the different
demographic groups at retirement. In other words, the value of annuitization derived by
each demographic group will be unaffected by the differences in wealth levels across
groups. The CRRA utility structure is:

1

,

(10)

where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. More risk-averse individuals will
value annuities more highly than less risk-averse individuals. Consistent with earlier
studies such as Hubbard et al. (1995), a γ parameter of 3 is used for the main analysis.
Sensitivity analysis using an alternative value of γ

1 is also presented since a risk

aversion of 1 corresponds to log utility, and has been found to be the average risk
aversion in prior studies on consumption (e.g. Laibson et al. 1998).
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See Turra and Mitchell (2008), Brown (2003, 2001), and Mitchell et al. (1999).
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The analysis proceeds with a counterfactual exercise using two scenarios.
Assume that an individual has initial financial wealth

∗

. In the first scenario,

individuals have full access to an annuity market where single-life, fixed-payout,
nominal payout annuities are sold. Assume that the individual annuitizes all resources
0 . The annual income she obtains from the annuity

she has, i.e.

is

determined by the pricing scheme used by the insurer. For the special case in which the
annuity is actuarially-fair for the individual,

is determined by:

∗

,
∑

1

(11)

1

where is the real interest rate, and

is the inflation rate. The maximum utility

∗

the

individual attains in this first scenario can be found by solving the maximization
problem subject to the constraints in Equation (2).
Turning to the second scenario, assume now that no annuity market is available.
∗

That is,

and

0, ∀ . I solve the maximization problem again and find the

amount of additional wealth, ∆ , which must be given to the individual (in the absence
of annuities) so that she can achieve the utility level

∗

. Given this setup, the annuity

equivalent wealth (AEW) is thus defined as:
∗

∆
∗

.

(12)

In essence, the utility-based measure of AEW is similar to the Equivalent Variation
measure in applied welfare analysis. Specifically, it quantifies how much an
individual’s wealth needs to be multiplied by (in a scenario without annuities) in order
to generate the same utility level as in the scenario where annuities are available. In a
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multi-period life-cycle model with risk-averse individuals, the AEW is typically a
number greater than unity since the option of annuitization is valuable. Following
Brown (2003), the simulations here assume

=

=

= 3%.108 Also, simulations only

focus on annuity contracts that pay fixed, nominal benefit streams.109
Annuity Equivalent Wealth Results
Annuity prices (defined here as the annual annuity income for a given
premium110) are constructed by replacing the

in Equation (11) with the appropriate

set of survival probabilities. For example, if annuities are priced based on age and sex
only, then the annuity income for a married, or unmarried, 65-year old female is found
using the average survival probabilities of 65-year old females. It is important to note
that the mortality rates used as input to determine pricing are only averages and
significant dispersion in mortality will exist among say, the group of 65-year old
females. As such, annuities that are age-sex priced in an actuarially-fair manner for 65year old females will be more than actuarially-fair for a married 65-year old female with
no diseases, and less than actuarially-fair for an unmarried, low-cognition 65-year old
female.
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Some important parameters adopted in this present paper are different from Brown (2003), for instance,
mortality inputs, age of annuitization, and limiting age. While Brown (2003) considers mortality
differentiated by age, sex, race, and education, this present paper differentiates risk-groups by age, sex,
education, marital status, and disease conditions. The selection of risk-classes is important since
correlations among the risk-classes affect the amount of mortality heterogeneity across the various riskgroups, and in turn affect the dispersion in AEW results.
109
The focus of this present paper is on the dispersion in annuity equivalent wealth ensuing across
different pricing schemes, thus only one annuity type is illustrated. Readers who are interested in how the
dispersion in AEW varies across annuity types can refer to Brown (2003).
110
Annuity pricing can be expressed in two ways. The first is that the insurer determines the annuity
premium as in the MWR analysis. This applies to a fixed-payout annuity (e.g. annuity pays $500/month
for life). The second is that the insurer determines the quantum of payout for a given premium invested.
This applies when the annuitant decides to invest, say $100,000, in an annuity. In both cases, the insurer
sets the ‘price’ and annuitant is the price-taker.
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Table 3.5 reports the annual annuity income for a $100,000 policy under various
pricing schemes. If individual-life annuities are age-sex priced, a 65-year old male will
receive $10,898 per year, while a female will receive a lower annual income of $9,492
due to her longer life expectancy. Under pricing scheme S3, lowly-educated individuals
will benefit from an increase in annuity income. In particular, the Table shows that
lowly-educated males now receive $12,344 in annual income as compared to $10,898
under scheme S2. In contrast, better educated individuals experience a decline in
annuity income. A high school-educated female now receives only $9,036 (compare
$9,492 under S2) since her premium educational level is now factored into the annuity
pricing. In the very detailed pricing scheme S4, an unmarried, lowly-educated male will
receive $5,527 more annually than a married high school-educated female for the same
given annuity premium of $100,000.
[Table 3.5 here]
Table 3.6A presents the annuity equivalent wealth for different demographic
groups under different pricing schemes. Results show that the utility gains from
annuitization are substantial for both genders under the age-sex pricing scheme used in
the U.S. annuity market today. This finding is consistent with previous empirical
analyses (e.g. Brown 2003; Mitchell et al. 1999). In particular, females – on average –
have an AEW of 1.474, meaning that they will be indifferent between $1 of annuitized
wealth and $1.47 of non-annuitized wealth. Compared to average females, women with
longevity-enhancing attributes such as being married, or being highly-educated, enjoy
even higher AEW values (1.482 to 1.495) because they have higher survival
probabilities and are thus more likely to be alive to consume the annuity.
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[Table 3.6 here]
Average males have an AEW of 1.644; this is comparable to Brown (2003)’s
figure of 1.633 under age-sex pricing. The Table also shows that unmarried or lowlyeducated males have lower AEW values than the average male. These risk-groups find
annuities less valuable since they are less likely to survive to consume the annuity.
Nonetheless, even those with very poor mortality prospects benefit from the
annuitization option. For example, even the ‘bottom’ risk-group of unmarried, lowlyeducated males with high blood disease has an AEW of 1.445.
As with the money’s worth analysis, AEW results here show that shorter-lived
groups find annuities more valuable as pricing becomes more detailed while longerlived groups find annuities less valuable. The ‘bottom’ group experiences a 30%
increase in utility moving from age-sex pricing to scheme S4 and it should be noted that
these utility gains are achieved by adding just a couple of pricing factors. In contrast,
the ‘top’ group experiences a modest 8% loss in utility but still obtains a decent AEW
of about 1.4 under the detailed pricing schemes. Sensitivity analysis shows that the
AEW figures are generally smaller under log utility, i.e. =1 (see Table 3.6B). This is
because individuals with lower degree of risk aversion value annuities less than those
who are more risk-averse. Nonetheless, the finding that high-mortality-risk groups
benefit the most from annuitization when annuity pricing becomes more detailed
remains robust.
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Annuities provide valuable longevity insurance to individuals with uncertain
lifetimes. The aging of the boomer generation in the U.S. and the global advent of
individual retirement accounts will likely increase the demand for annuities. Yet in the
U.S. as well as in many other developed countries, prices of most standard retail
annuities do not reflect buyers’ personal characteristics other than age and sex. Some
impediments to annuity underwriting may be costs and thin annuity markets. It may also
be that insurers think underwriting is not profitable, which would be true if mortality
differentials were not substantial.111 Nonetheless, the results in this paper suggest that
mortality differentials are in fact substantial. Explained variation in mortality doubles
from 6.7% to 12.6% just by using education and marital status, in addition to age and
sex. Adjusted R2 increases further increases to 29.7% when the ten best-ranked factors
are used along with age and sex. Moreover, these factors are readily-measurable and
therefore not costly to collect.
A main contribution of this paper has been to show that more detailed pricing
may reduce adverse selection in annuity markets. This can be attributed to two effects
that occur when more pricing factors are implemented. First, shorter-lived groups may
be sufficiently induced to buy annuities. Where they may have stayed out of the market
previously, they may now decide to annuitize since they are able to obtain decent MWR
values of 0.8 to 0.9. Adding just one or two risk factors to age-sex pricing results in
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The Appendix discusses one strategy that an insurer can use to benefit economically from annuity
underwriting. Assuming a unilateral deviation, an insurer can possibly make a supernormal profit margin
of about 12 to 14% from a cherry-picking strategy by selling annuities only to shorter-lived groups at the
age-sex price.
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substantial financial gains (13-15%) for these groups. In relation, the AEW analysis
shows that shorter-lived groups can attractive utility gains of about 30% when more
detailed pricing is implemented. The second effect is that longer-lived groups will still
be incentivized to stay in the annuity market. Although more detailed pricing schemes
results in higher premiums for the longer-lived groups, they are not severely penalized.
These groups experience only modest financial and utility losses of about 3 to 5%. With
the shorter-lived groups entering the annuity market and longer-lived continuing to
consume annuities, annuity markets are likely to grow which in turn reduces adverse
selection.
Overall, these findings lend support to the movement towards risk-based annuity
pricing for standard retail products, which has already begun in the U.K. and may
possibly spread to other parts of the world. On the other hand, it implies that the
European Union’s recent elimination of the use of sex in insurance pricing – should it
be extended to annuities – represents a step backwards for the ongoing efforts towards
risk-classification. Reducing the number of risk-classes will bring about greater
dispersion in annuity values between the shorter and longer-lived risk-groups, which
has possible redistributive implications in the event that all individuals purchase
annuities, for example under a mandate. 112 One limitation of this study is that the
analysis is performed for a hypothetical cohort of 65-year-old individuals, without
employing weights relevant to the HRS sample used for regression analysis. Future
112

Annuitization mandates have been actively considered by policymakers as a longevity risk
management tool. For example, annuitization was compulsory in U.K. defined contributions plans for
many years until recently. Singapore will implement an annuitization mandate in its national provident
fund by 2013 (Fong et al. 2011). Mandating life annuity purchase may be one approach to limiting
adverse selection in annuity markets, provided that appropriate regulation is in place (Bateman et al.
2001).
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research can extend the analysis to the nationally representative sample of HRS
respondents. This will allow me to better model selection effects under various pricing
schemes and also quantify the impact of more detailed pricing on adverse selection for a
nationally representative mix of risk classes in the population at large.
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Appendix: Case Analysis of a Unilateral Deviation Strategy
This Appendix quantifies the approximate size of profits that an insurer can
make when it collects more annuitant information, and uses that to earn supernormal
profits through a cherry-picking strategy. To set up this case analysis, I assume a
mandatory annuitization environment and everyone in the weighted HRS sample
(described in Section 3.2) buys annuities. On the supply-side, assume there are only two
annuity providers A and B. Since the prevailing pricing scheme in the market is ‘agesex’ pricing, both Insurers A and B set premiums using only these two factors. Further,
assume zero-loads. Suppose Insurer A is the Government with no profit motive and is
willing to sell annuities to any buyer as long as the system breaks-even on average. If
Insurer A serves 100% of the market, it will collect total premiums of $3.396 billion
(see Table appended). In addition, its estimated costs of payouts based on just age and
sex is also $3.396 billion. It makes no profit and breaks-even.
Now consider a unilateral deviation by Insurer B. First, Insurer B performs
annuity underwriting and collects information on the top 12 factors (including education,
marital status, some disease conditions etc., as outlined in Section 3.3) from all
annuitants. Using a wider information set, it is able to estimate the expected costs of
payouts for each individual more precisely. Insurer B then devises a cherry-picking
strategy: it will only sell annuities to people whose expected cost of payout is below the
age-sex price. Assuming that Insurer B gets to cherry-pick the annuitants, it will serve
only 35.7% of the market. It will charge these annuitants the age-sex premium (as set by
the prevailing pricing scheme) and collect $1.207 billion. The Table appended shows
Insurer B’s costs estimate is only $1.059 billion, implying a supernormal profit margin
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of about 12%. This analysis assumes a naïve market structure. Supernormal profits will
not persist very long, and can be quickly competed away. Nonetheless, the figure of 12%
represents a useful upper bound on the supernormal profits that can be achieved from
annuity underwriting through a novel cherry-picking strategy. Since this upper bound is
not too small, it suggests that annuity underwriting insurers can make abnormal profits
through more detailed pricing.

Insurer A
Number of policies sold
% of total market covered
Premiums collected (age-sex price)
Expected costs of payouts (using age & sex)
“Supernormal” Profit
Insurer B
Number of policies sold
% of total market covered
Premiums collected (age-sex price)
Expected costs of payouts (using 12 factors)
"Supernormal" Profit
Profit as % of revenue (Profit Margin)

High interest
(6%)

Low interest
(4%)

22,729,947
100%

22,729,947
100%

$3.396b
$3.396b
$0

$4.195b
$4.195b
$0

8,108,301
35.7%

8,501,370
37.4%

$1.207b
$1.059b
$0.147b
12%

$1.563b
$1.342b
$0.220b
14%

Source: Author.
Notes: Dollar amounts in $billions. The sample consists of 9,047 age-eligible HRS respondents first
interviewed in 1992 and baseline sampling weights are applied. Assume there are only two annuity
providers A and B. The prevailing pricing scheme in the market is ‘age-sex’ pricing, so both A and B set
premiums based only on age and sex. Insurer A only knows the annuitants’ age and sex so it estimates its
expected costs based only on these two factors.
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Table 3.1: Hazard Ratios for Mortality in the HRS, 1992 – 2008, Gompertz
proportional hazards model (N=9,047)

Age
Male

(M1)

(M2)

(M3)

(M4)

HR [95% CI]

HR [95% CI]

HR [95% CI]

HR [95% CI]

1.09***
[1.07,1.10]
1.62***
[1.46,1.78]

1.07***
[1.05,1.09]
1.92***
[1.72,2.13]
1.18***
[1.05,1.33]
0.73***
[0.66,0.82]
0.69***
[0.62,0.77]

1.07***
[1.05,1.08]
1.83***
[1.64,2.05]
1.14**
[1.00,1.30]
0.79***
[0.70,0.89]
0.70***
[0.63,0.79]

1.08***
[1.06,1.09]
1.69***
[1.51,1.89]
1.12*
[0.98,1.27]
0.94
[0.83,1.06]
0.81***
[0.72,0.91]

2.93***
[2.18,3.93]
0.83***
[0.73,0.94]
0.85**
[0.74,0.98]

2.97***
[2.18,4.03]
0.83***
[0.73,0.94]
0.84**
[0.73,0.97]

2.16***
[1.56,2.99]
0.87**
[0.77,0.98]
0.89*
[0.77,1.02]

1.99***
[1.62,2.44]
2.49***
[2.18,2.84]
1.63***
[1.42,1.87]
1.40***
[1.26,1.56]
2.28***
[1.93,2.69]
1.57***
[1.32,1.86]
1.73***
[1.36,2.21]
1.06
[0.95,1.18]

1.99***
[1.62,2.44]
2.49***
[2.19,2.85]
1.61***
[1.41,1.85]
1.37***
[1.23,1.53]
2.19***
[1.85,2.60]
1.54***
[1.30,1.83]
1.71***
[1.34,2.19]
1.05
[0.94,1.17]

1.82***
[1.49,2.23]
2.18***
[1.90,2.50]
1.34***
[1.16,1.54]
1.30***
[1.16,1.45]
1.62***
[1.37,1.91]
1.30***
[1.09,1.54]
1.47***
[1.16,1.87]
0.93
[0.83,1.04]

0.90
[0.77,1.06]
0.96
[0.83,1.12]
0.74***
[0.58,0.93]
0.63***
[0.50,0.80]
0.97***
[0.96,0.99]

0.90
[0.77,1.06]
0.90
[0.77,1.04]
0.75**
[0.59,0.94]
0.64***
[0.51,0.81]
0.98***
[0.97,0.99]

Nonwhite
Schooling ≥ 12 years
Married
BMI (ref=normal weight):
Underweight
Overweight
Obese
Prior health history:
Ever-have Cancer (=1)
Diabetes
Heart disease / attack
High blood pressure
Chronic lung disease
Major psychiatric
condition
Stroke
Arthritis
Birth region (ref = Northeast region):
Midwest region
South region
West region
Not born in the US
Cognition (memory score)
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(M1)

(M2)

(M3)

(M4)

HR [95% CI]

HR [95% CI]

HR [95% CI]

HR [95% CI]

1.08
[0.93,1.24]
0.93
[0.81,1.07]
0.95***
[0.92,0.99]
1.00
[0.96,1.04]

1.13*
[0.98,1.30]
0.94
[0.82,1.08]
0.96**
[0.93,0.99]
1.00
[0.97,1.04]

Father education ≥ 12 years
Mother education ≥ 12 years
Father’s Longevity
Mother’s Longevity
Self-reported health (ref=excellent):
Very Good

1.27**
[1.05,1.54]
1.68***
[1.39,2.02]
2.29***
[1.85,2.82]
3.02***
[2.38,3.81]
1.76***
[1.56,1.99]
1.41***
[1.23,1.62]
0.94
[0.84,1.05]

Good
Fair
Poor
Currently smoke (=1)
Ever smoke (=1)
Ever drink (=1)
Gamma ( )

0.0063

0.0076

0.0077

0.0081

# observations
df

58,467
190.78
2

58,467
1,287.06
16

58,467
1,336.73
30

58,467
1,622.97
37

Adjusted

6.7%

29.7%

30.6%

36.7%

Source: Author; see text.
Notes: HR = hazard ratios (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01), CI = 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
The sample consists of 9,047 age-eligible HRS respondents first interviewed in 1992. Analyses are weighted by baseyear respondent-level weights to account for over-sampling of blacks, Hispanics, and Floridians. M2 adds
conventional, predetermined covariates (race, education, whether married, and weight), M3 adds less-conventional,
predetermined risk factors (birth region, cognition scores, parental factors), and M4 adds conventional,

endogenous variables (self-reported health, smoking, and drinking). is the shape parameter of the
is the Wald chi-square statistic which compares the log pseudo-likelihood of the
baseline hazard.
fitted model against a null model. A model with more parameters will always have a higher statistic;
whether it fits significantly better than a model with fewer parameters is determined by calculating the pvalue of the difference in
between models, together with the associated degrees of freedom (df). The
for survival models measures how much of the variation in outcome in a Gompertz
adjusted
proportional hazards model is accounted for through the prognostic index ( ), adjusting the dimension
of the model. Flags for missing, and imputed, values for these variables are included in the analysis: birth
region, father’s education, mother’s education (p<.10), and parental longevity.

120

Table 3.2: Benefit Flows to Annuitants (for age 65 annuity purchasers; =6%)
Subgroups of 65-year olds

Expected benefit flows

Top: No high blood, Married, HS-educated, Females
Married, HS-educated, Females
HS-educated, Females
Females
65-year-olds
Males
Lowly-educated, Males
Not married, Lowly-educated, Males
Bottom: High blood, Not married, Lowly-educated,
Males

$152
145
140
133
126
117
104
91
81

Source: Author.
Notes: The benefit flows pertain to a standard, nominal, whole life, retail annuity that pays $1/month to
65-year-old would-be annuity purchasers. Simulations are based on a nominal annual interest rate of 6%
and a terminal age of 120. The risk-group of ‘No high blood, Married, HS-educated, Females’ is the
longest-lived group analyzed in this Table and marked “Top”. Correspondingly, ‘High blood, Unmarried,
Low-educated, Males’ is the shortest-lived group and marked “Bottom”.
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Table 3.3: Annuity Premiums Charged under Different Pricing Schemes (for age
65 annuity purchasers; =6%; zero-loads)
Different Pricing
Schemes

# pricing
factors

Age-only

1

Age, sex

2

Age, sex, education

3

Age, sex,
education, marital
status

4

:
:
Age, sex,
education, marital
status, high blood,
cognition

:
:

Prices ($)

# distinct
premiums

Single price:

$126

F:
M:
HS-educated F:
Less-educated F:
HS-educated M:
Less-educated M:
Married, HS-educated F:
Unmarried, HS-educated F:
Married, less-educated F:
Unmarried, less-educated F:
Married, HS-educated M:
Unmarried, HS-educated M:
Married, less-educated M:
Unmarried, less-educated M:
:
:

$134
117
$140
122
125
104
$145
129
129
111
128
110
109
91
:
:

1
2
4

8

:
:

6

:
:

$67-153

32

:
:

:
:

:
:

:
:

:
:

All top 12 factors:
Age, sex,
education, marital
status, high blood,
cognition, diabetes,
lung disease, heart
disease, cancer,
BMI, psychiatric.

12

:
:

$4-161

4,096

Source: Author; see text.
Notes: Only one of these pricing schemes is adopted by the insurer at any one time. Premiums are set by the insurer
and offered to 65-year-old would-be annuity purchasers. Simulations are based on a single-life, nominal, standard
retail annuity with fixed $1/month payouts, a nominal interest rate of 6%, and a terminal age of 120. The distinct
number of prices in each row is obtained by multiplying the number of categories that is associated with each
additional pricing factor. For example, ‘sex’ is associated with only two categories (male/female) but ‘BMI’ is
associated with four categories (underweight / normal weight/ overweight/obsess). In addition, only a group of 65year old annuitants is considered here. In other words, age is fixed. If age is allowed to vary, as it would in a random
pool of annuitants, the number of distinct prices that will be larger than that indicated here.
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Table 3.4: Money’s Worth Ratios for Various Risk-groups under Different Pricing
Schemes (age 65 annuity purchasers)
A: Money’s Worth Ratios ( =6%)
Simpler Pricing

Top: No high blood, Married,
High-school (HS)-educated, Females
Married, HS-educated, Females
HS-educated, Females
Females
65-year-olds
Males
Low-educated, Males
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried,
Low-educated, Males

More Detailed Pricing

S1
Age-only

S2
Age & sex

S3
+ Educ.

S4
+ Marital

1.204

1.133

1.081

1.047

1.150
1.114
1.062
1.000
0.931
0.827
0.722

1.082
1.048
1.000
1.000
0.889
0.775

1.032
1.000
1.000
0.873

1.000
1.000

0.645

0.693

0.780

0.893

-6%
+7%

-5%
+13%

-3%
+15%

Decline in MWR (for Top)
Increase in MWR (for Bottom)
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B: Money’s Worth Ratios ( =4%)
Simpler Pricing

Top: No high blood, Married,
High-school (HS)-educated, Females
Married, HS-educated, Females
HS-educated, Females
Females
65-year-olds
Males
Low-educated, Males
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried,
Low-educated, Males

More Detailed Pricing

S1
Age-only

S2
Age & sex

S3
+ Educ.

S4
+ Marital

1.254

1.166

1.102

1.059

1.184
1.138
1.075
1.000
0.918
0.801
0.686

1.101
1.059
1.000
1.000
0.872
0.747

1.040
1.000
1.000
0.857

1.000
1.000

0.605

0.659

0.756

0.882

-7%
+9%

-6%
+15%

-4%
+17%

Decline in MWR (for Top)
Increase in MWR (for Bottom)
Source: Author; see text.

Notes: These calculations are the MWR values available to 65-year-old would-be annuity purchasers. The
dashes indicated cases where the premium for that risk-group cannot be defined under the prevailing
pricing scheme. Simulations are based on a single-life, nominal annuity with fixed $1/month payouts, a
nominal interest rate of 4% or 6%, and a terminal age of 120. S1 denotes a pricing scheme using 1 riskclass (age-only); S2 denotes a scheme using 2 risk-classes (age and sex), and so on. For example, the S4
scheme uses four pricing factors: age, sex, education, and marital status. The risk-group of ‘No high
blood, Married, HS-educated, Females’ is the longest-lived group analyzed in this Table and marked
“Top”. Correspondingly, ‘High blood, Unmarried, Low-educated, Males’ is the shortest-lived group and
marked “Bottom”. Moving from left to right, the relative change in MWR for both of these groups is
shown at the end of the Table.
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Table 3.5: Annual Annuity Income from $100,000 Policy under Different Pricing
Schemes (for age 65 annuity purchasers;
3%; zero-loads)
Simpler Pricing

More Detailed Pricing

S1
Age-only

S2
Age & sex

S3
+ Educ.

S4
+ Marital

Top: No high blood, Married,
High-school (HS)-educated, Females
Married, HS-educated, Females
HS-educated, Females
Females
65-year-olds

$10,109

$9,492

$9,036

$8,742

10,109
10,109
10,109
10,109

9,492
9,492
9,492

9,036
9,036
-

8,742
-

-

-

-

Males

10,109

Low-educated, Males
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried,
Low-educated, Males

10,109
10,109

10,898
10,898
10,898

12,344
12,344

14,269

10,109

10,898

12,344

14,269

Source: Author; see text.

Notes: These calculations are based on a single-life, nominal, standard retail annuity that charges a lumpsum premium of $100,000 in exchange for fixed annual payouts. Additional parameters include a real
interest rate of 3%, an inflation rate of 3%, an annuitization age of 65, and a terminal age of 120. S1
denotes a pricing scheme using 1 risk-class (age-only); S2 denotes a scheme using 2 risk-classes (age and
sex), and so on. For example, the S4 scheme uses four pricing factors: age, sex, education, and marital
status. The dashes indicated cases where the annuity payout for that risk-group cannot be defined under
the prevailing pricing scheme; for example, it is necessary to determine the educational status of the
annuitant under Scheme S3 since low-educated annuitants will receive higher annuity income. The riskgroup of ‘No high blood, Married, HS-educated, Females’ is the longest-lived group analyzed in this
Table and marked “Top”. Correspondingly, ‘High blood, Unmarried, Low-educated, Males’ is the
shortest-lived group and marked “Bottom”.
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Table 3.6: Annuity Equivalent Wealth for Various Risk-groups under Different
Pricing Schemes (age 65 annuity purchasers;
3%; zero-loads)
A: Annuity Equivalent Wealth (CRRA utility with =3)
Simpler Pricing

Top: No high blood, Married,
High-school (HS)-educated, Females
Married, HS-educated, Females
HS-educated, Females
Females
65-year-olds
Males
Low-educated, Males
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried,
Low-educated, Males

More Detailed Pricing

S1
Age-only

S2
Age & sex

S3
+ Educ.

S4
+ Marital

1.592

1.495

1.421

1.374

1.583
1.577
1.568
1.552
1.527
1.471
1.406

1.488
1.482
1.474
1.644
1.586
1.512

1.415
1.411
1.791
1.709

1.368
1.972

1.342

1.445

1.633

1.882

-6%
+8%

-5%
+13%

-3%
+15%

Decline in AEW (for Top)
Increase in AEW (for Bottom)
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B: Annuity Equivalent Wealth (CRRA utility with =1)
Simpler Pricing

Top: No high blood, Married,
High-school (HS)-educated, Females
Married, HS-educated, Females
HS-educated, Females
Females
65-year-olds
Males
Low-educated, Males
Unmarried, Low-educated, Males
Bottom: High blood, Unmarried,
Low-educated, Males

More Detailed Pricing

S1
Age-only

S2
Age & sex

S3
+ Educ.

S4
+ Marital

1.535

1.441

1.372

1.328

1.509
1.492
1.466
1.429
1.376
1.289
1.192

1.419
1.402
1.377
1.483
1.388
1.279

1.351
1.336
1.571
1.447

1.307
1.671

1.127

1.198

1.346

1.554

-6%
6%

-5%
12%

-3%
15%

Decline in AEW (for Top)
Increase in AEW (for Bottom)

Source: Author; see text.
Notes: These calculations are based on a single-life, nominal annuity that charges a lump-sum premium of $100,000
in exchange for fixed annual payouts (as illustrated in Table 3.5). Additional parameters include a real
interest rate of 3%, an inflation rate of 3%, an annuitization age of 65, and a terminal age of 120. S1

denotes a pricing scheme using 1 risk-class (age-only); S2 denotes a scheme using 2 risk-classes (age and
sex), and so on. For example, scheme S4 uses four pricing factors: age, sex, education, and marital status.
The dashes in the Table represent cases where annuity pricing cannot be defined for that risk-group, thus
AEW is not computed for that group.
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Appendix Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
This Appendix provides basic descriptive statistics of the sample of 9,047 respondents
in the baseline HRS cohort. Age distribution is pretty even across the range of 51 – 61;
average age is 56. Approximately 79% of the respondents are white, 95% have a
religion, and 90% are born in the US. Average education is about 12.1 years of
schooling. About a third of the individuals are normal weight, 1.3% is underweight, and
the rest are overweight or obese. In terms of parental factors, father’s years of schooling
is slightly lower than that of mother’s years of schooling, and more respondents’
mothers are alive at baseline than are their fathers.
Variable

Mean

Individual demographic characteristics
Male
Average age at interview
Race: nonwhite
Married
Born in the US
Has religion
Place of birth (by region):
1. Northeast
2. Midwest
3. South
4. West
5. Not in the US
Socioeconomic factors
Own years of schooling
Father's years of schooling
Mother's years of schooling
Parental longevity
Father alive
Mother alive
Father's age at death (if deceased)
Mother's age at death (if deceased)
Father's current age (if alive)
Mother's current age (if alive)
Health & Cognition
BMI:
Underweight (BMI < 18.5)

45.4%
56.0 (3.18)
21.2%
72.7%
90.3%
95.3%
17.6.%
25.3%
38.7%
7.9%
10.5%
12.1 (3.20)
8.8 (3.81)
9.1 (3.52)
16.4%
42.2%
68.0 (13.85)
68.5 (14.93)
80.9 (5.62)
79.3 (5.85)

1.3%
128

Variable

Mean
Normal weight (18.5 ≤ BMI <25)
Overweight (25 ≤ BMI <30)
Obese (30 ≤ BMI )
Ever-have Cancer
Ever-have Diabetes
Ever-have Heart condition
Ever-have High blood pressure
Ever-have chronic lung disease
Ever-have major psychiatric condition
Ever-have Stroke
Ever-have Arthritis
Cognition: Memory score only (scale 0 – 40)

N

33.6%
40.8%
24.3%
4.8%
9.6%
10.6%
34.7%
5.3%
7.1%
2.4%
34.5%
12.8 (5.24)
9,047

Source: Author.

Notes: Percentages are shown for dichotomous variables, and means with standard deviations in
parentheses are shown for continuous variables and some categorical variables (e.g. years of schooling).
Statistics shown here are solely for baseline 1992 variables. The baseline cognition measure features only
the memory score (based on word recall items) as the rest of the cognition test questions were not asked
until wave 3. Missing values for these variables are flagged: parental education, parental longevity, birth
region, BMI, and cognition scores. The birth regions are organized as follows: the Northeast Region
comprises New England and Middle Atlantic divisions; the Midwest Region comprises East North and
West North divisions; the South region comprises South Atlantic, East South, and West South divisions;
the West region comprises Mountain and Pacific divisions.
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Appendix Table 3.2: Comparing Hazard Ratios for Mortality in the HRS by Age
Groups (1992 – 2008, Gompertz proportional hazards model, N=9,047)
(M3)
All Ages
HR [95% CI]

(M3) By Age Group
Age 50-57
Age 58-62
HR [95% CI]
HR [95% CI]

1.07 [1.05,1.08]***
1.83 [1.64,2.05]***
1.14 [1.00,1.30]**
0.79 [0.70,0.89]***
0.70 [0.63,0.79]***

1.05 [1.02,1.08]***
1.78 [1.54,2.05]***
1.13 [0.95,1.34]
0.81 [0.68,0.95]***
0.71 [0.61,0.82]***

1.04 [0.97,1.12]
1.89 [1.59,2.25]***
1.12 [0.91,1.37]
0.77 [0.64,0.93]***
0.69 [0.58,0.83]***

Age
Male
Nonwhite
Own schooling ≥ 12 years
Married
BMI (ref=normal weight):
Underweight
Overweight
Obese
Prior health history:
Ever-have Cancer (=1)
Diabetes
Heart disease / attack
High blood pressure
Chronic lung disease
Major psychiatric condition
Stroke
Arthritis
Birth region (ref = Northeast):
Midwest region
South region
West region
Not born in the US
Cognition (memory score)
Father education ≥ 12 years
Mother education ≥ 12 years
Father’s Longevity
Mother’s Longevity

2.97 [2.18,4.03]***
0.83 [0.73,0.94]***
0.84 [0.73,0.97]**

3.15 [2.16,4.60]***
0.82 [0.69,0.97]**
0.87 [0.72,1.04]

2.59 [1.55,4.33]***
0.84 [0.70,1.02]*
0.80 [0.64,1.01]*

1.99 [1.62,2.44]***
2.49 [2.19,2.85]***
1.61 [1.41,1.85]***
1.37 [1.23,1.53]***
2.19 [1.85,2.60] ***
1.54 [1.30,1.83]***
1.71 [1.34,2.19]***
1.05 [0.94,1.17]

2.25 [1.72,2.93]***
2.61 [2.18,3.13]***
1.72 [1.43,2.07]***
1.40 [1.21,1.62]***
2.01 [1.60,2.53]***
1.56 [1.25,1.95]***
1.81 [1.27,2.57]***
1.00 [0.87,1.16]

1.72 [1.26,2.36]***
2.38 [1.95,2.90]***
1.48 [1.20,1.83]***
1.33 [1.13,1.58]***
2.60 [2.03,3.33]***
1.44 [1.08,1.91]**
1.61 [1.16,2.22]***
1.11 [0.94,1.31]

0.90 [0.77,1.06]
0.96 [0.83,1.12]
0.74 [0.58,0.93]***
0.63 [0.50,0.80]***
0.97 [0.96,0.99]***
1.08 [0.93,1.24]
0.93 [0.81,1.07]
0.95 [0.92,0.99]***
1.00 [0.96,1.04]

0.84 [0.68,1.03]*
0.91 [0.74,1.10]
0.66 [0.49,0.91]**
0.64 [0.47,0.86]***
0.98 [0.96,0.99]***
0.97 [0.81,1.16]
0.91 [0.76,1.08]
0.93 [0.89,0.98]***
0.99 [0.94,1.04]

1.00 [0.78,1.27]
1.06 [0.84,1.33]
0.83 [0.59,1.18]
0.63 [0.44,0.89]***
0.97 [0.95,0.99]***
1.26 [1.00,1.59]**
0.96 [0.77,1.19]
0.99 [0.94,1.05]
1.01 [0.96,1.07]

Gamma ( )

0.0077

0.0077

0.0078

# observations

58,467
1,336.73
30

40,525
771.327
30

17,942
555.9522
30

df

Source: Author; see text.
Notes: HR = hazard ratios (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01), CI = 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
The sample consists of 9,047 age-eligible HRS respondents first interviewed in 1992. Analyses are
weighted by base-year respondent-level weights to account for over-sampling of blacks, Hispanics, and
Floridians. is the shape parameter of the baseline hazard.
is the Wald chi-square statistic which
compares the log pseudo-likelihood of the fitted model against a null model. Flags for missing, and
imputed, values for these variables are included in the analysis: birth region, father’s education, mother’s
education (p<.10), and parental longevity.
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